Haynes Land & Livestock Company, a partnership v. Jacob Family Chalk Creek, LLC, a limited liability company; et al. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
Haynes Land & Livestock Company, a partnership
v. Jacob Family Chalk Creek, LLC, a limited liability
company; et al. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jonathan O. Hafen; Bryan S. Johansen; Parr, Brown, Gee & Loveless; Attorneys for Appellees.
Ray G. Martineau; Anthony R. Martineau; Bret D. Cragun; Leslie W. Slaugh; Howard, Lewis &
Petersen; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Haynes Land & Livestock v. Jacob Family Chalk Creek, No. 20080858 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1231
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, a partnership, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, 
a limited liability company; et al., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 20080858-CA 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS (HAYNES PARTIES) 
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL DECREE 
OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE BRUCE C. LUBECK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Jonathan 0. Hafen 
Bryan S. Johansen 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street STE 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Jacob Family Chalk Creek, 
LLC; Catherine B. Christensen, L.L.C.; 
and Brian Garff 
Brent A. Bohman 
PO Box 120 
Morgan, UT 84050 
Attorney for Gerald Boyer, Gregory 
Boyer, Fern Boyer, J.S. Hansen, and 
Alfred C. Blonquist 
Ray G. Martineau (2105) 
Anthony R. Martineau (5859) 
Brett D. Cragun (8683) 
3098 Highland Drive STE 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-0200 
Email: rmartineau@martineaulaw.net 
Leslie W. Slaugh (3752), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Email: SlaughL@ProvoLawyers.com 
Attorneys for Haynes Land & Livestock 
Company and Triple H. Ranch, LC 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN - I 2009 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, a partnership, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, 
a limited liability company; et al., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 20080858-CA 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS (HAYNES PARTIES) 
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL DECREE 
OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE BRUCE C. LUBECK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Jonathan O. Hafen 
Bryan S. Johansen 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street STE 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Jacob Family Chalk Creek, 
LLC; Catherine B. Christensen, L.L.C.; 
and Brian Garff 
Brent A. Bohman 
PO Box 120 
Morgan, UT 84050 
Attorney for Gerald Boyer, Gregory 
Boyer, Fern Boyer, J.S. Hansen, and 
Alfred C. Blonquist 
RayG. Martineau(2105) 
Anthony R. Martineau (5859) 
Brett D. Cragun (8683) 
3098 Highland Drive STE 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-0200 
Email: rmartineau@martineaulaw.net 
Leslie W. Slaugh (3752), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 1248 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Email: SlaughL@ProvoLawyers.com 
Attorneys for Haynes Land & Livestock 
Company and Triple H. Ranch, LC 
LIST OF PARTIES 
Parties asserting the roads are private: 
Represented before the trial court by Ray G. Martineau, Anthony R. Martineau, and Brett 
D. Cragun, Law Offices of Ray G. Martineau, and by Leslie W. Slaugh, of Howard, Lewis 
& Petersen, P.C.: 
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, a partnership 
TRIPLE H RANCH, LC, a limited liability company 
CHALK CREEK-HOYSTVILLE WATER USERS CORPORATION, a corporation 
Represented before the trial court by Stephen G. Swendimen and Julie I. Valdes, Assistant 
Attorneys General: 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through the DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 
DIVISION OF FIRE, FORESTRY AND STATE LANDS 
Parties asserting the roads are public; 
Represented before the trial court by Clark Waddoups, Jonathan O. Hafen, and Tobi 
Potestio, of Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless: 
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, a limited liability company 
CATHERINE B. CHRISTENSEN, L.L.C., a limited liability company 
BRIAN GARFF, an individual 
Represented before the trial court by Brent A. Bohman (these parties were originally 
represented by George S. Young and Michael S. Johnson, ofPruitt, Gushee & Bachtell): 
FERN J. BOYER 
GERALD G. BOYER 
GREGORY J. BOYER 
J.S. HANSEN 
ALFRED C. BLONQUIST 
Represented before the trial court by David L. Thomas and Jami R. Brackin: 
SUMMIT COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Utah 
Other persons named in the pleadings but who did not appear at trial; 
DAVID B. WILLIAMS 
KAREL J. SNYDER 
J.S. HANSEN 
HELEN W. BLONQUIST 
BARBARA HALL and KEVIN HALL 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF PARTIES i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6 
A. Nature of the Case 6 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 6 
C. Statement of Facts 10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 14 
ARGUMENT 16 
I: ANY INCREASE IN WIDTH OF A ROAD DEDICATED TO THE 
PUBLIC BY USE MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE COURT; THE 
COUNTY CANNOT TAKE A WIDER PATH THAN THAT 
ABANDONED BY THE LANDOWNER 16 
A. Utah Cases Uniformly Hold That Where a Road Is Dedicated to 
the Public by Use, the Court Determines the Width of the Road; 
No Case Holds Width Is Determined by the County 16 
B. Determinating the Width of a Road Dedicated by Use Is a Core 
Judicial Function That Cannot Be Delegated to the County 22 
C. This Court Should Remand with Instructions to Fix the Road 
Width at 18 Feet in Accordance with the Trial Court's Findings. . . . 26 
II: HAYNES WAS ENTITLED TO A DECREE QUIETING TITLE 
AGAINST ALL UNRECORDED ACCESS CLAIMS BEYOND 
THOSE EXPRESSLY FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT 27 
hi 
Ill: THE TRIAL COURT ON REMAND SHOULD DETERMINE THE 
ROAD WIDTH BASED ON THE WIDTH AND NATURE OF USE 
FROM 1880 TO 1896 29 
IV: THE HISTORICAL RECORDS DID NOT PROVIDE CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF TEN YEARS PUBLIC USE OF THE 
ROADS 32 
A. The Controlling Evidence Was Documentary and Not Disputed; 
this Court Should Therefore Make Its Own Determination as to 
the Legal Effect of the Evidence 32 
B. Private Property Rights Are Constitutionally Protected and Can 
Be Overcome Only by Clear and Convincing Evidence 37 
C. Occasional Limited Use by Homesteaders, Hunters, and Other 
Such Persons Does Not Create a Public Road 39 
D. The Evidence Did Not Establish Continuous Public Use of the 
East Fork Road 42 
E. Use of Wild, Uncultivated, and Unenclosed Land Is Presumed 
Permissive 44 
F. The Evidence Did Not Establish Ten Years Continuous Public 
Use of the Bench Road 47 
CONCLUSION 49 
APPENDIX 
A. Memorandum Decision, March 21, 2008, R-Haynes 1393-1477 
B. Ruling and Order, August 29, 2008, R-Haynes 1678-1692 
C. Order and Final Judgment, September 16, 2008, R-Haynes 1693-1700 
D. Map of properties, Exhibit 117 
iv 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 70 P.3d 35 29 
Baxter v. Utah Dep't ofTransp., 783 P.2d 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 28 
Bench v. Bechtel Civil & Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 33 
Blonquist v. Blonquist, 30 Utah 2d 234, 516 P.2d 343 (1973) 17 
Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107 (1958) 18, 25 
Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n, 947 P.2d 671 (Utah 1997) 21 
Burrows v. Guest, 5 Utah 91, 12 P. 847 (1887) 18 
Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Corp., 909 P. 2d 
225 (Utah 1995) 17, 18 
Christensen v. Industrial Comm'n, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982) 21 
Clark v. Erekson, 9 Utah 2d 212, 341 P.2d 424 (1959) 17 
Corruthers v. King, 363 S.W.2d413 (Ark. 1963) 45 
Deseret Livestock Co. v. Sharp, 123 Utah 353, 259 P.2d 607 (1953) 18 
Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995) 17, 38, 39, 47, 48 
Gatrell v. Salt Lake County, 106 Utah 409, 149 P.2d 827 (1944) 28 
Gawv. State, 798 P.2d 1130 (UtahCt. App. 1990) 4, 5 
Hamerly v. Denton, 359 P.2d 121 (Alaska 1961) 41 
Hunsaker v. State, 29 Utah 2d 322, 509 P.2d 352 (1973) 17 
Jennings Investment, LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119 18 
v 
Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 P.2d 420 (1941) 18, 26, 31 
Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 33 
Kirkv. Schultz, 63 Idaho278, 119 P.2d266 (1941) 41 
Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 18, 24, 25 
Roller v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 346 39, 40, 48 
Lee v. Masner, 45 P.3d 794 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). 39, 40 
Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981) 17, 38 
Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646 (1929). . . 18, 40, 41 
Luchetti v. Bandler, 108 N.M. 682 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) 41 
Luevano v. Maestas, 874 P.2d 788 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) 47 
Lyons v. Baptist Sch. of Christian Training, 804 A.2d 364 (Me. 2002) 45 
Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 
1990) 28 
Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982) 17, 31 
Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah243, 161 P. 1127 (1916) 46 
Moulton v. Irish, 218 P. 1053 (Mont. 1923) 41 
Oregon S. L. R.R. v. Murray City, 2 Utah 2d 427, 277 P.2d 798 (1954) 40 
Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545 (1968) 38 
ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 5 
Reese v. Tingey Constr., 2008 UT 1, 177 P.3d 605 2 
Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. Telluride Power Transmission Co., 23 Utah 22, 
63 P. 995 (1900) 39 
vi 
Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994) 22, 23 
Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983) 17, 24 
Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988) 31 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005) . . . . 31, 38, 39 
Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 493 P.2d 639 (1972) 40 
Thurnwaldv. A.E., 2007 UT 38, 163 P.3d 623 30 
Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, 179 P.3d 775 45, 47 
Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate ofS.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, 144 P.3d 1083 30 
Vaughn v. Williams, 345 So. 2d 1195 (La. Ct. App. 1977) 30 
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, 179 P.3d 768 4, 38, 41 
Weihlv. Wagner, 569 N.E.2d297 (111 Ct. App. 1991) 45 
Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 
(Utah 1987) 3, 17 
Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah 341, 44 P. 1032 (1896) 18 
Wilson v. Hull, 7 Utah 90, 92,24 P. 799 (Utah 1890) 45 
Constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules cited: 
1917 Utah Laws, ch. 74 § 2 17, 19, 20, 22 
1963 Utah Laws, ch. 39, § 93 (codified at Utah Code § 27-12-93) 20 
Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932, 
repealed by Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), Pub.L. 
No. 94-579 § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743 (commonly called R.S. 2477) 41,44 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City § 42-7-5 (1975) 24 
vii 
U.S. Const, amend. V 30, 37 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 36-1-4 (1943) 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3) (2001) 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 (2001), enacted by Utah Laws 1998, ch. 270, § 136 . . . 2, 5, 
14, 16-23 
Utah Code § 72-5-104 16, 21, 22, 30 
Utah Code § 72-5-104(1) (2006) 5, 6, 30 
Utah Const, art I, § 22 30, 37 
Utah Const, art VIII, § 1 22 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) 2 
Utah Rev. Stat. § 25-1-1117 (1898) 20, 22 
viii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, a partnership, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, 
a limited liability company; et al., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 20080858-CA 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS (HAYNES PARTIES) 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT1 
The Order and Final Judgment was entered September 16, 2008.2 The Notice of 
Appeal was timely filed on October 14,2008 ;3 an Amended Notice of Appeal (eliminating 
Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users Corporation as an appellant) was filed October 16, 
2008.4 
'The trial court record consists of papers from two cases that were ultimately 
consolidated, but the papers in each case were indexed separately for appeal. Papers from 
Haynes Land & Livestock Co. v. Jacob Family Chalk Creek, trial court case no. 980600244, 
will be cited as "R-Haynes." Papers from Triple HRanch, LC v. Boyer, trial court case no. 
000600299, will be cited as "R-TripleH." 
2R-Haynes 1693-1700. 
3R-Haynes 1701-1705. 
4R-Haynes 1711-1715. 
1 
The Order and Final Judgment contained a certification of finality under Rule 54(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.5 A claim for partition by Triple H Ranch, LC against 
Fern Boyer, Gerald Boyer, Gregory Boyer, J.S. Hansen, and Alfred C. Blonquist remains 
pending before the trial court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Where a court determines that a road has been dedicated to the public by use 
for ten years, may the court then delegate to a county the determination of the road's width? 
Standard of review: The trial court determined that Utah Code § 72-5-108 directs that 
the width of highways, including highways dedicated by user, be determined by the highway 
authority of that particular jurisdiction. The appeal of this decision presents a question of 
statutory construction that is reviewed for correctness.6 
Preservation below: The Haynes parties requested that the trial court determine width 
in Plaintiffs' Trial Brief.7 This issue was also raised in Haynes' Motion for Reconsideration 
of Road Width.8 
2. Where a party has sued to quiet title, asserting that defendant had no rights of 
travel over plaintiffs property other than rights already of record, and the defendant did not 
5R-Haynes 1697. 
* Reese v. Tingey Constr., 2008 UT 7, f 6, 177 P.3d 605, 607. 
7R-Haynes 1271-1273. The trial court's statement that the width issue "was not 
mentioned in pre-trial briefs," R-Haynes 1470, is incorrect. 
8R-Haynes 1500-1503. 
2 
dispute plaintiffs legal title but claimed and proved only a particular public road across 
plaintiffs property, was plaintiff entitled to a decree that defendant had no other rights of 
travel across plaintiffs property? 
Standard of review: This issue does not challenge the trial court's findings but 
disputes the conclusions of law. "While findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are 
clearly erroneous, conclusions of law are simply reviewed for correctness without any special 
deference."9 
Preservation below: The Haynes parties raised this issue below in Haynes' Objection 
to Jacob-Christensen's Proposed Form of Order.10 
3. Where an owner abandons a road to the public by permitting limited use, may 
the court fix the width of the road based on contemplated future uses that are significantly 
more burdensome than the uses permitted by the landowner? 
Standard of review: This presents issues of constitutional and statutory construction 
that are reviewed for correctness. 
Preservation below: This was raised in the pretrial11 and post-trial12 memoranda filed 
by Haynes. 
9
 Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 
1377-1378 (Utah 1987). 
10R-Haynes 1526, 1633-34. 
nR-Haynes 1271-1273. 
12R-Haynes 1374-1376. 
3 
4. Should occasional travel over wild, uncultivated, and unenclosed land be 
considered permissive? 
Standard of review: "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal interpretation of 
the Dedication Statute for correctness and its factual findings for clear error."13 Where the 
court exercises its discretion based on a misunderstanding of the law, however, that 
constitutes an abuse of discretion.14 
Preservation below: This was argued in the post-trial memorandum of Haynes.15 
5. Where a survey map showed a road existed, did comments in j oumals and other 
historic documents showing sporadic activities in a particular area, without mentioning travel 
over the roads or specifying a path of travel, constitute clear and convincing evidence of 
continuous public, non-permissive use of the entire length of the road? 
Standard of review: "But whether the facts of a case satisfy the requirements of the 
Dedication Statute is a mixed question of fact and law that involves various and complex 
facts, evidentiary resolutions, and credibility determinations. Thus, an appellate court 
reviews a trial court's decision regarding whether a public highway has been established 
under the Dedication Statute for correctness but grants the court significant discretion in its 
uWasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, f 8, 179 P.3d 768. 
l4Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
15R-Haynes 1367-1368. 
4 
application of the facts to the statute."16 Where the court exercises its discretion based on a 
misunderstanding of the law, however, that constitutes an abuse of discretion.17 
Preservation below: A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence need not be 
"preserved" by raising it before the trial court.18 Haynes did, however, argue that the 
evidence of public use was not clear and convincing.19 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code § 72-5-104(1) (2006): "A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use 
of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often 
years." 
Utah Code § 72-5-108: "The width of rights-of-way for public highways shall be set 
as the highway authorities of the state, counties, or municipalities may determine for the 
highways under their respective jurisdiction." 
16
 Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, f 8, 179 P.3d 768. 
llGaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
nProMaxDev. Corp, v. Mattson, 943 P.2d247,256 (Ct. App. 1997), cert denied, 953 
P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). 
19R-Haynes 1364-1366. 
5 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a civil case seeking a declaration that certain roads were private. Other parties 
asserted that the roads became public under Utah Code § 72-5-104(1) (2006) or that other 
easements existed. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Haynes Latnd & Livestock Company ("Haynes") sued its adjoining landowners, Jacob 
Family Chalk Creek, Limited,20 Catherine B. Christensen, L.L.C., and Brian Garff (jointly 
referred to in this brief as "Jacobs"), seeking a determination that Jacobs had no rights of 
travel over the Haynes property beyond existing recorded easements.21 Haynes also sought 
to enjoin Garff from constructing a sizeable building on the Jacobs property.22 Summit 
County was initially named as a defendant23 but was later dismissed.24 Jacobs 
counterclaimed to establish that the roads over the Haynes property were public or subject 
to easements in favor of Jacobs.25 
20Jacob Feimily Chalk Creek, LLC, later acquired the title and was substituted as a 
party. R-Haynes 1162-1164. 
21R-Haynes 1-9. 
22R-Haynes 5-6. 
23R-Haynes 6-7. 
24R-Haynes 54-55. 
25R-Haynes 65-79. 
6 
Triple H Ranch, LC, a limited liability company with the same principals as Haynes 
Land & Livestock Company, also commenced a suit for partition by sale against certain 
members of the Boyer families and others that owned interests in property surrounding Boyer 
Lake.26 Among other allegations, the partition complaint asserted that the defendants had no 
lawful access to the properties. The Boyer defendants27 counterclaimed, seeking among 
other claims a determination that a road leading to the lake was a public county road.28 The 
defendants other than the Boyer defendants either disclaimed any interest in the property29 
or were dismissed from the action.30 The Boyer defendants later filed an amended 
counterclaim and third-party complaint naming additional parties and asserting among other 
claims that the roads were public or that the Boyer defendants had prescriptive easements.31 
The two lawsuits were consolidated for purposes of both discovery and trial.32 After 
consolidation of the cases, Jacobs filed an amended answer and counterclaim against all 
26R-TripleH 1-6. 
27Fern J. Boyer, Gerald G. Boyer, Gregory J. Boyer, J.S. Hansen, and Alfred C. 
Blonquist. R-TripleH 19-29. 
28R-TripleH 25-26. 
29R-TripleH 38-39 (disclaimer by Barbara Hall and Kevin Hall); R-TripleH 51 
(disclaimer by Karel Snyder). 
30R-TripleH 40-41 (dismissing Helen W. Blonquist and Helen W. Blonquist, Trustee.) 
3lR-TripleH 81-94. 
32R-Haynes 107-110. 
7 
parties in both actions.33 A certificate of default was entered against Stillman Seven, Barbara 
Hall, Kevin Hall, Helen W. Blonquist, and Karel J. Snyder.34 B.A. Bingham and Sons, LLC, 
answered the counterclaim35 but elected to not appear at trial.36 David B. Williams likewise 
answered37 but elected to not appear at trial.38 
Summit County was named as a defendant in the initial complaint filed by Haynes, 
but was later dismissed.39 Summit County was subsequently brought back into the lawsuit 
as a defendant to the counterclaim filed by Jacobs.40 
Prior to trial, the parties stipulated and the trial court ordered that trial of the partition 
claims be bifurcated from the road and easement claims.41 
33R-Haynes 189-209. 
34R-Haynes 518-521. 
35R-Haynes 222-227. 
36Transcript vol. I, 8; R-Haynes 1316-1318. 
37R-Haynes 297-311. 
38R-Haynes 1312-1315. 
39R-Haynes 1-9, 54-55. 
40R-Haynes 189-209. 
4,R-Haynes 1155-1161, 1165-1170. 
8 
Following discovery, Jacobs moved for summary judgment on its claim for public 
road determination.42 Boyers joined in the motion.43 The trial court denied the motion.44 
On October 3, 2007, the trial court, counsel, and parties participated in a day-long 
journey to the property at issue, crossing the Haynes and Jacob properties while counsel and 
others pointed out various sites.45 
A bench trial was held March 4-7, with oral arguments on March 11, 2008.46 At the 
beginning of trial, Haynes stipulated that Jacobs had a prescriptive easement over the Bench 
Road consistent with historical use.47 The trial court issued a memorandum decision on 
March 21,2008, finding essentially that the Bench Road was public, the Middle Fork Road 
was public to a point just short of Boyer Lake, and that the East Fork Road was public to the 
middle of section 8. The court stated that it would fix the width of the road at 18 feet if 
called upon to make a width decision, but held that the width should instead be determined 
by Summit County.48 
42R-Haynes 536-540. 
43R-Haynes 907-909. 
44R-Haynes 912-962. 
45R-Haynes 1036-1037, 1401-1402. 
46R-Haynes 1319-1327, 1339-1340. 
47Transcript vol. I, 13-14. 
48R-Haynes 1393-1477. 
All parties raised various objections to the trial court's ruling. Haynes primarily 
sought reconsideration of the delegation of the width determination to Summit County49 and 
objected to the form of order presented by Jacobs.50 Jacobs moved to reopen to present 
evidence on width.51 Boyers moved to reconsider the grant to the Water Users of an 
easement over the Boyer property.52 The trial court made minor modifications to the form 
of order but otherwise denied the post-trial motions.53 Haynes appealed54 the trial court's 
decision, and Jacobs and Boyers cross-appealed.55 
C. Statement of Facts 
The Chalk Creek Road, State Road 133, travels generally easterly from Coalville (in 
Summit County), through Upton, and eventually to Wyoming. The road at issue in this case 
departs to the south off the highway about seven miles east of Upton, along the East Fork of 
Chalk Creek.56 A map of the properties and roads is in the appendix for the convenience of 
the Court. 
49R-Haynes 1500-1503, 1504-1521. 
50R-Haynes 1522-1520, 1530-1544. 
51R-Haynes 1478-1481, 1482-1492. 
52R-Haynes 1606-1608, 1609-1618. 
53R-Haynes 1678-1692. 
54R-Haynes 1711-1715. 
55R-Haynes 1716-1720, 1721-1725. 
56R-Haynes 1405. 
10 
Haynes own approximately 10,000 acres of property in this area, with the northern 
portion of the Haynes property adjacent to Highway 133. Jacobs also own approximately 
10,000 acres in the same area; their property is generally south and west of the Haynes 
property. The primary access to the Jacobs property is over the Haynes property.57 Various 
paths of travel have existed over the properties, including particularly a rough road that loops 
through the properties. The road begins at Highway 133 and travels generally south over the 
Haynes property to the Jacobs property (Bench Road), then south and east over the Jacobs 
property (Middle Fork Road) to a reservoir (Boyer Lake) on property owned by the Chalk 
Creek-Hoytsville Water Users Corporation. The Boyer parties have an undivided interest 
(together with Triple H Ranch) in approximately 37 acres of property in five non-contiguous 
parcels surrounding Boyer Lake. From the Boyer Lake the road travels generally south and 
west across the Haynes property (East Fork Road) to join the Bench Road south of Highway 
133.58 
The roads at issue were narrow, two-track roads ranging from 8 feet 10 feet in width.59 
The initial two miles of the Bench Road on the Haynes property was recently improved and 
now has an average width of 18 feet, but historically it was also 8 to 10 feet wide.60 The 
'Exhibit 117; R-Haynes 1403-1404. 
*R-Haynes 1406-1409; Exhibit 117. 
'Transcript vol. 1,149-150; vol. II, 331-332; vol. Ill, 611,620; vol. IV, 712,797,818. 
^Transcr iptvol . IV, 821. 
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entire loop is on private property and bounded by extensive private properties on both sides 
of the road - there are no public destinations for which the road affords access.61 
Howard Haynes, a sheep rancher and father of the original principals of Haynes Land 
& Livestock Co., purchased the northern part of the Haynes property in 1932.62 He leased 
the remainder of what is now the Haynes property and purchased it in 1940 and 1941.63 
From the time of his purchase in 1932 he maintained a policy of locking the gates for 24 
hours at least once each year, and also restricted access during the hunting seasons and at 
other times.64 
Irv Jacobs and A.E. Christensen, the predecessors of the current defendants (jointly 
referred to in this brief as "Jacobs"), purchased their property in 1938.65 Jacobs have 
maintained a locked gate at the entrance to their property for as long as anyone can 
remember, and prior to this lawsuit the Jacobs believed their road was private.66 
Evidentially because the parties did not then believe a public road existed, in 1939 the 
predecessor to the Haynes interest conveyed to Jacobs's predecessor an express easement 
over the Bench Road allowing the owners of the Jacobs property to cross the Haynes property 
61See R-Haynes 1466. 
62Transcript vol. Ill, 608-609. 
63Exhibit 48; Transcript vol. Ill, 609, 645. 
64Transcript vol. Ill, 612, 613-617, 676-677, 709, 722, 771. 
65Transcript vol. II, 262. 
66Transcript vol. I, 166, 199, 243, 335. 
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for limited agricultural purposes.67 Haynes stipulated at trial that Jacobs have also acquired 
a prescriptive easement over the Bench Road for recreational and other purposes relating to 
the existing and historical uses of the property.68 A 1975 map of Class D roads (unimproved 
county roads) in Summit County shows the entire loop of the road as a public road.69 Summit 
County stipulated, however, that there was no evidence the map had ever been officially 
adopted or approved by the Summit County commission.70 
Jacobs constructed three "cabins" on their property without objection from the 
Haynes.71 When Brian Garff began building a large fourth cabin, however, and Jacobs 
sought to expand their use beyond the scope of the historical deeded easement,72 Haynes filed 
this action to quiet title to the Haynes property and to restrict access to the historical uses. 
The trial court found that the Bench Road, most of the Middle Fork Road, and a short 
section of the East Fork Road became public based on use from 1880 to 1896.73 At that time, 
the even numbered sections were owned by the railroad, and the odd numbered sections were 
67Exhibits 7-9. 
68Transcript vol. I, 13-14. 
69Exhibitll4. 
70Transcript vol. IV, 876. 
7lTranscript vol. I, 121, 186; vol. II, 273-274; vol. Ill, 625. 
72Transcript vol. II, p. 405. 
73R-Haynes 1459. 
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federal land.74 Historical documents show that during that period a few homesteaders staked 
claims on the property and a few sawmills were operated in the area.75 There are also reports 
of individuals hunting and fishing in the area.76 Additional detail concerning this evidence 
is presented in the argument section below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Where a court declares that a road has been abandoned and dedicated to the public by 
public use, the court may either leave the road at its existing width or declare the width 
necessary to accommodate the historic uses. The court may not, however, delegate the 
determination of width to a county, especially where that county is a party to the lawsuit. 
Fixing the width of a road that has become public by use is a judicial function that cannot be 
delegated. Utah cases uniformly hold that it is the court that determines width; no case 
authorizes delegating that decision to a county. Utah Code § 72-5-108 authorizes a county 
to set minimum road standards, but does not give a county authority to "find" the width of 
a road dedicated to the public by use. 
This Court should fix the width of the road at 18 feet, in accordance with express 
findings made by the trial court. In the event this Court determines to remand for additional 
proceedings, however, this Court should clarify that the width of the road is only that 
currently necessary to support the historical (1880-1896) uses. Current uses or contemplated 
74Exhibit 127; transcript vol. I, 87. 
15E.g., Exhibits 137, 142. 
16E.g., Exhibits 139, 161. 
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future uses should not be considered. Any other standard would unconstitutionally allow the 
public to take more than the landowner abandoned, without paying just compensation. 
Haynes was entitled to a decree quieting title against all roads except those proved by 
the defendants. Haynes proved record title to the property. The burden of proof to establish 
any exceptions to that title rested on defendants. Defendants proved some roads. Haynes 
was entitled to a decree that no other roads existed. 
No evidence was presented often years continuous public use of the East Fork Road. 
Similarly, the evidence regarding use of the Bench Road was not clear and convincing that 
members of the public used the road for ten continuous years. Occasional use by individuals 
looking for a homestead site is too sporadic to qualify as continuous public use; use by the 
homesteaders themselves is not use by the public. Sawmill operators had permission to build 
their sawmills; use of the road by their customers was similarly permissive. Most 
importantly, all this land was wild, unenclosed land, and this Court should hold that public 
use of such lands is presumed permissive. 
15 
ARGUMENT 
I: ANY INCREASE IN WIDTH OF A ROAD DEDICATED TO THE 
PUBLIC BY USE MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE COURT; 
THE COUNTY CANNOT TAKE A WIDER PATH THAN THAT 
ABANDONED BY THE LANDOWNER. 
A. Utah Cases Uniformly Hold That Where a Road Is Dedicated to the Public by Use, 
the Court Determines the Width of the Road; No Case Holds Width Is Determined by 
the County. 
The Order and Final Judgment entered by the trial court declared that certain roads 
have become public under the road dedication statute,77 and then decreed: "The width of the 
portions of the Road that have been declared a public way shall be determined by Summit 
County, Utah according to that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel based 
on the facts and circumstances."78 The trial court made this delegation to Summit County 
based on the court's interpretation of Utah Code § 72-5-108, which states: "The width of 
rights-of-way for public highways shall be set as the highway authorities of the state, 
counties, or municipalities may determine for the highways under their respective 
jurisdiction." 
The discussion below shows that delegating the road width determination was 
improper. Section 72-5-108 merely authorizes a highway authority to set road standards that 
must be satisfied by, for example, new roads or roads serving new developments. The statute 
does not and could not authorize a highway authority to take without just compensation 
77Utah Code §72-5-104. 
78R-Haynes 16974 12. 
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whatever additional property is necessary to enable an existing road to meet those standards. 
A court adjudicating a road dedication case can either find road width based on the evidence, 
or if inadequate evidence was presented the court can make no width determination and leave 
the road at its existing width. But, a court cannot delegate to a county or other highway 
authority the factual determination of how much width the landowner dedicated and 
abandoned to the public. 
Section 72-5-108 or a predecessor statute has been in effect in Utah since at least 
1917.79 During this time of nearly 100 years, and in fact extending prior to the statute's 
enactment back to at least 1887, numerous decisions of the Utah appellate courts have 
directly or by implication confirmed that the width of a road abandoned to the public under 
the road dedication statute is determined by the court.80 ' • • 
791917 Utah Laws ch. 74 § 1117. 
*°E.g. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Corp., 
909 P.2d 225,232 (Utah 1995) (It is "proper and necessary for the court in defining the road 
to determine its width[.]"); Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 
1995) ("[Determination of road width] depends upon the full adjudication of the relevant 
facts that will be unearthed at trial."); Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. 
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987) (trial court fixed width at ten feet); 
Schaerv. State,657?.2d 1337,1342 (Utah 1983) ("width of the highway presents a question 
of fact"); Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982) (case remanded for further 
findings on the issue of width); Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 
211,213 (Utah 1981) (trial court set the width at 30 feet); Blonquist v. Blonquist, 30 Utah 
2d 234,236, 516 P.2d 343, 344 (1973) ("brought before the court to determine the width of 
the roadway"); Hunsaker v. State, 29 Utah 2d 322, 325-326, 509 P.2d 352, 355 (1973) 
("Even without the statutory presumption as to the width of the highway, the evidence in the 
instant case concerning the location of fences and the usual width of the highway in the 
vicinity is sufficient to sustain the determination of the trial court."); Clark v. Erekson, 9 
Utah 2d 212, 214, 341 P.2d 424, 426 (1959) ("There is also no merit to appellants' 
contention that there is insufficient evidence to support the court's finding as to the width of 
17 
There is no reported Utah decision delegating that decision to a county or other 
legislative body. In at least one decision, the trial court elected to make no decision as to 
road width, and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's right to make no decision 
"when that issue was not the focus of the litigation."81 But, making no decision is not the 
same as specifically delegating the decision to a county. If the trial court makes no decision, 
the parties are left with the road in its existing condition. At that point, section 72-5-108 
would not authorize a county to declare a width wider than the existing width without making 
just compensation,82 any more than that county would have authority to widen any other road 
without making just compensation. 
the road."); Boyer v. Clark, 7 Utah 2d 395, 398, 326 P.2d 107, 109 (1958) (the trial court on 
remand must determine "the width of the highway, which must be determined in accordance 
with what is reasonable and necessary for the uses to which the road has been put"); Deseret 
Livestock Co. v. Sharp, 123 Utah 353,357,259 P.2d 607,610 (1953) (trial court determined 
road width was 100 feet); Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1,9,116 P.2d 420,424 (1941) ("A 
particular use having been established, such width should be decreed by the court as will 
make such use convenient and safe."); Lindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 75 Utah 
384, 392, 285 P. 646, 649 (1929) ("We further approve the findings and conclusion of the 
court as to the width of the road."); Whitesides v. Green, 13 Utah 341, 349-350,44 P. 1032, 
1033 (1896)"(width must be determined from a consideration of the facts and circumstances 
peculiar to the case"); Burrows v. Guest, 5 Utah 91, 99, 12 P. 847, 851 (1887) (width "is a 
question of fact for the jury"); Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 914 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
("Because the trial court failed to make this determination [concerning road width], we 
remand for this limited purpose."); Jennings Investment, LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 
UT App 119, \ 34 (width determination reversed because not supported by adequate 
findings; cause remanded to trial court to determine the reasonable and necessary width of 
the road). 
%x
 Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Corp., 909 
P.2d 225, 232 (Utah 1995). 
nSee constitutional arguments at page 30 below. 
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Under the trial court's interpretation of section 72-5-108, a county could, without any 
judicial process whatsoever, simply decide that a historically two-track road eight feet wide 
was now going to be 36 feet wide, or 66 feet wide, or more, all without paying any 
compensation to the owner of the property affected. The same logic would permit a county 
to increase the width of any other public road, without incurring an obligation to pay just 
compensation to the affected landowner. Such a taking would obviously violate the 
constitutional protections of private property.83 
Notably, neither Jacobs nor the trial court identified any decision which approved 
delegating the road width determination to a county or other legislative entity. 
Section 72-5-108 and its predecessor statutes have been reenacted or modified several 
times over the last century, but the essential provisions of the statutes have remained 
constant. Comp. Laws 1917, § 1117,84 enacted in 1917, provided: 
The width of rights of way for State roads shall be such 
as will meet with the approval of the State Road Commission, 
and the widths of rights of way to be used for county roads, 
alleys, lanes, trails, private highways, and by-roads shall be 
such as may be deemed necessary by the Board of County 
Commissioners; provided, that nothing in this Act shall be so 
construed as to increase or diminish the width of either kind of 
highways already established or used as such; provided, further, 
that nothing in this Act contained shall prevent cities from 
laying out, establishing, opening or accepting the dedication of 
See arguments at page 30 below. 
Enacted by 1917 Utah Laws ch. 74 § 2. 
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streets, avenues, boulevards and alleys of any width the council 
of such cities shall deem proper.85 
In the 1943 codification of the Utah Code, the section appeared as follows: 
The width of rights of way for state roads shall be such 
as the state road commission may determine, and the width of 
rights of way to be used for county highways shall be such as 
may be deemed necessary by the board of county 
commissioners; provided, that nothing in this title shall prevent 
cities or towns from laying out, establishing or opening, or 
accepting the dedication of, streets and alleys of any width the 
governing body thereof shall deem proper.86 
In 1963 the provision was reenacted as follows: 
The width of rights-of-way for public highways shall be 
such as the highway authorities of the state, counties, cities or 
towns may determine for such highways under their respective 
jurisdiction.87 
The statute was amended to its present form in 1998: 
The width of rights-of-way for public highways shall be 
set as the highway authorities of the state, counties, or 
municipalities may determine for the highways under their 
respective jurisdiction.88 
85Comp. Laws Utah § 1117 (1907) (italics added). The predecessor to this section 
was Utah Rev. Stat. § 25-1-1117 (1898), which stated: "The width of all public highways, 
except bridges, alleys, lanes, and trails, shall be at least sixty-six feet. The width of all 
private highways and by-roads, except bridges, shall be at least twenty fee; provided, that 
nothing in this title shall be so construed as to increase or diminish the width of either kind 
of highway already established or used as such." 
86Utah Code Ann. § 36-1-4 (1943). 
871963 Utah Laws, ch. 39, § 93 (codified at Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-93). 
88Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-108 (2001) (enacted by 1998 Utah Laws, ch. 270, § 136). 
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"A well-established canon of statutory construction provides that where a legislature 
amends a portion of a statute but leaves other portions unamended, or re-enacts them without 
change, the legislature is presumed to have been satisfied with prior judicial constructions 
of the unchanged portions of the statute and to have adopted them as consistent with its own 
intent.89 This Court should, therefore, hold that the meaning of section 72-5-108 is consistent 
with the long line of court decisions holding that the width of a road dedicated by use is to 
be determined by a court, not by a legislative body. 
This is confirmed by recent changes to the road dedication statute. After the 
commencement of this case, section 72-5-104 was amended to clarify that"[t]he scope of the 
right of way is that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel according to the 
facts and circumstances."90 This provision is substantive, and therefore cannot apply to this 
action.91 This provision illustrates, however, that section 72-2-108 does not apply to road 
dedication cases. If determination of road width were already governed by section 72-2-108, 
there would have been no reason to enact a separate provision in section 72-5-104 stating the 
factors to be considered in determining road width. Also, if the Legislature disagreed with 
the numerous cases holding that width is set by the court and intended that road width be 
^ Christensen v. Industrial Comm 'n, 642 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982). 
90Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(3) (2001). 
91
"A 'substantive' change, or one that affects substantive rights, may not be applied 
retroactively." Brown & Root Indus, Serv. v. Industrial Comm 'n, 947 P.2d 671, 675 (Utah 
1997). As a practical matter, however, subsection (3) essentially restated existing case law 
as to the width of the road. 
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determined by a county rather than the court, the Legislature would have been expected to 
state that explicitly in section 72-5-104. 
The initial enactment of this provision also confirms that its purpose was to set 
standards, not to allow the highway authority to take additional land. Comp. Laws 1917, § 
1117,92 enacted in 1917, provided: "nothing in this Act shall be so construed as to increase 
or diminish the width of either kind of highways already established or used as such[.]"93 
This Court should hold that section 72-5-108 does not authorize a county or highway 
authority to fix the initial width of a road dedicated by public use. That statute permits a 
county to set minimum standards for certain types of roads, but does not permit the county 
to take additional property to meet those standards. The trial court's decision to delegate the 
determination of width to the County should be reversed. 
B. Determinating the Width of a Road Dedicated by Use Is a Core Judicial Function 
That Cannot Be Delegated to the County. 
"Article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution . . . provides that the judicial power 
of the state shall be vested in the courts."94 The trial court delegated to Summit County the 
authority to conclude this litigation by determining the width of the road that had been 
dedicated to the public. Such a delegation of a core judicial function violates the separation 
of powers doctrine inherent in the Utah Constitution. 
92Enacted by 1917 Utah Laws ch. 74 § 2. 
93Comp. Laws Utah § 1117 (1907) (italics added). The predecessor to this section, 
Utah Rev. Stat. § 25-1-1117 (1898), contained a similar provision. 
94SaltLake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 848 (Utah 1994). 
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"The term 'judicial power of courts' is generally understood to be the power to hear 
and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation."95 The 
authorities cited in subpoint I. A. above show that determination of road width is an integral 
part of a road dedication case. Determining width is part of determining the controversy 
between the adverse parties. The "legislature is not free to authorize by statute other 
persons" to perform such core judicial functions.96 It follows that section 72-5-108 cannot 
constitutionally permit a trial court to delegate the determination of road width to a county 
legislative body. 
There is an inherent difference between determining road width in a case involving 
road dedication by use, and the decision a public road authority makes in fixing standards 
applicable to a county road to be used for development or other county-approved purposes. 
In a road dedication case, the road width determines the amount of private property dedicated 
by the private landowner. Fixing that width (finding what the landowner voluntarily gave 
to the public) is an inherently factual determination. The decision of a legislative body, in 
contrast, is based on policy considerations concerning aesthetics, ease of maintenance, and 
potential future expansion, among other factors. A county is an institutionally poor forum 
for finding facts-the trial court gave no explanation of how the County is to receive evidence, 
95Id. at 848 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
96Id. at 856-57 (Howe, J., concurring) (because Justice Howe's concurring opinion 
was joined by Justice Stewart and Justice Russon, it represents the view of the majority of 
the court. 
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or even if the County is required to consider evidence from the parties.97 A county is not a 
proper forum to resolve the inherently factual issues of what width was abandoned to the 
public. 
The principle that a court, not the county, must determine road width is confirmed in 
several cases. In Schaer v. Utah Dept. of Transportation?* the trial court fixed the width of 
a road based on city ordinances. The Utah Supreme Court rejected that approach: 
In granting the plaintiffs motion, the trial court 
apparently relied on the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City 
§ 42-7-5 (1975), as establishing the width of the dugway road at 
fifty feet as a matter of law. This reliance was misplaced. That 
ordinance merely sets forth the minimum standards and 
requirements regarding the widths of streets in a proposed 
subdivision plan. It does not address the reasonable and 
necessary width of a highway dedicated to the public under 
U.C.A., 1953, § 27-12-89. However, even though that 
ordinance does not establish the width of the dugway road as a 
matter of law, it may be offered as evidence of what is 
considered reasonable and necessary under the circumstances." 
If it is improper to rely solely on municipal ordinances to establish width, it follows it would 
be even more improper to just turn the matter over to the municipality. In Kohler v. 
Martin™ this Court reversed because "the trial court erred in failing to assess the reasonable 
97
 Although the trial court expressly assumed the County would "conduct hearings and 
consider input," R-Haynes 1687, in fact on December 17, 2008, the County by resolution 
fixed the road width at 36 feet without holding any hearing or allowing any input whatsoever. 
98657P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983). 
"Id. at 1342 (italics added). 
100916 P.2d 910 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
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and necessary width of the roadway."101 Similarly, the supreme court in Boyer v. Clark102 
directed that the trial court determine the width of the road on remand.103 
The impropriety of allowing the County to determine the width of the road is further 
supported by analogy to a road acquired by condemnation. If a county were to condemn a 
right of way for a county road, the width of that road would be specifically determined. No 
one would claim the county could then go back and determine that a greater width was 
necessary, and take that greater width without a further condemnation proceeding and 
appropriate payment. Yet, that is exactly the authority the trial court purported to give the 
County here. The trial court found portions of the roads at issue were dedicated to the public. 
The width thus dedicated to the public is whatever it is, and it is not subject to further 
expansion based on what the County might think is necessary. 
It must be remembered that Summit County is a party to this action, not an 
independent adjudicative body. Delegating the width determination to the County in essence 
says to the County, "You won. Now take as much property as you want - feel free to choose 
how wide you want the road to be." Such a delegation of adjudicative authority to a party 
cannot be permitted. 
Determination of the road width must be based on factual findings concerning the 
historical use of the road and what is currently reasonable and necessary to support the 
l0 l/J.at914. 
1027 Utah 2d 395, 326 P.2d 107 (1958). 
103/</.at398,326P.2datl09. 
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historical use.104 Evidence on all of this was before the trial court. In fact, the trial court 
expressly stated its finding, for use in the event the delegation to the County were reversed: 
"If the court is responsible to declare a width the court believes the evidence and law allow 
the court to declare the road should be 18 feet in width."105 "The court defers to the county 
but if the court is wrong, rather than return to court, the above conclusions are the court's 
view on the matter."106 
This Court should hold that the trial court was wrong in deputizing the County to 
determine the width of the road abandoned and dedicated to the public. Such factual findings 
are judicial functions, and not properly delegated to a county legislative body. This Court 
should reverse the order delegating the road width determination to Summit County. 
C. This Court Should Remand with Instructions to Fix the Road Width at 18 Feet in 
Accordance with the Trial Court's Findings. 
The trial court recognized that its decision to delegate the road width determination 
to Summit County might be reversed, and made express findings to be used in that event. 
The trial court stated: 
58. . . . Again, the cases seem to say it is the court's 
responsibility but to this court the statute seems to say otherwise. 
If the court is responsible to declare a width the court believes 
the evidence and law allow the court to declare the road should 
be 18 feet in width.. . . 
mJeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 9, 116 P.2d 420, 424 (1941). 
105R-Haynes 1473. 
106R-Haynes 1474. 
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59. . . . The court defers to the county but if the court 
is wrong, rather than return to court, the above conclusions are 
the court's view on the matter.107 
As explained above, this Court should hold that it was the trial court's responsibility 
to declare the width of the road. Consistent with the trial court's express finding, this Court 
should remand to the trial court for entry of judgment fixing the width at 18 feet. 
II: HAYNES WAS ENTITLED TO A DECREE QUIETING TITLE 
AGAINST ALL UNRECORDED ACCESS CLAIMS BEYOND 
THOSE EXPRESSLY FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Paragraph 16 and other paragraphs of Haynes's Verified Complaint sought to quiet 
title in Haynes against all claims of access by Jacobs. The trial court denied that claim as to 
the Bench Road and part of the East Fork Road, but refused to expressly decree that Jacobs 
had no other rights over the Haynes property. One road at issue is the road to Red Hole. 
Some witnesses testified to using the road, but the trial court did not find any public or 
prescriptive rights over that road. The trial court described the road, which it labeled as the 
West Fork Road, as one "about which there seems little dispute."108 The trial court did not, 
however, determine that any party had obtained prescriptive or other rights to use that road. 
Where Haynes proved title to its property, Haynes was entitled to a decree quieting 
title in Haynes subject only to easements of record and the specific roads the trial court found 
to exist. 
Haynes sought the following relief: 
107R-Haynes 1473-1474. 
108R-Haynes 1408. 
27 
B. A declaratory judgment under Count II hereof 
adjudging that plaintiff is the owner and holder of the legal, 
equitable and record title to all of the Haynes Property free and 
clear of any and all right, title and interest of Garff and/or Jacob 
therein and thereto, except as expressly provided by the 
Agreement, Exhibit "D" attached hereto. 
C. A declaratory judgment under Count III hereof 
adjudging (a) that all of the roadways located upon the Haynes 
Property and the Jacob/Christensen property including the 
portions thereof which the County has heretofore erroneously 
designated as public and/or county roads, are in fact private and 
have never been and are not now public and/or county roads . . 
109 
Jacobs stipulated that Haynes had record title to the property.110 "[0]nce [a] quiet title 
plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of ownership, defendant has the burden of going 
forward with proof of his challenge to plaintiffs title."111 Therefore, Jacobs had the burden 
of proof to establish any unrecorded easements that it claimed may exist over the Haynes 
property. 
The trial court found a public road existed over the Bench Road and some portions 
of the East Fork Road, but did not find any other public roads over the Haynes property. 
Haynes acknowledged a prescriptive easement over the Bench Road; Jacobs did not prove 
any other prescriptive easements. Haynes was therefore entitled to a quiet title decree 
109R-Haynes 8. See also Verified Complaint ffi|16, 20 (R-Haynes 4, 5). 
li0Transcriptv. 1,9-10. 
111Baxter v. Utah Dep 't of Tramp., 783 P.2d 1045,1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), citing 
Gatrell v. Salt Lake County, 106 Utah 409, 411, 149 P.2d 827, 827 (1944). See also 
Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520, 524 
(Utah 1990). 
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determining that Jacobs do not have any rights of access over the Haynes property other than 
those already of record or specifically found by the trial court. The case should be remanded 
with directions to enter a decree in favor of Haynes determining that the parties to this action 
have no rights over or on the Haynes property other than rights of record and those 
specifically found by the trial court. 
Ill: THE TRIAL COURT ON REMAND SHOULD DETERMINE 
THE ROAD WIDTH BASED ON THE WIDTH AND NATURE 
OF USE FROM 1880 TO 1896. 
Haynes argues above in point I.C. that this Court should remand with directions to 
declare the road width is 18 feet. If, however, this Court determines to remand this case for 
findings as to road width, the Court should give guidance to the trial court by clarifying that 
the width of the roads must be determined in light of the use at the time of dedication, not 
contemplated future uses. The trial court found the roads were dedicated to the public by 
public use from 1880 to 1896,112 so the width should be such as would accommodate the uses 
made of the road from 1880 to 1896. Determining road width based on historical uses is 
required by Utah decisions and is compelled by constitutional considerations. The law 
relating to road width was disputed before the trial court,113 so clarification of the law for the 
benefit of the trial court on remand will promote judicial efficiency.114 
-R-Haynes 1459,^42. 
'See, e.g., R-Haynes 1469 \ 54. 
{Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, \ 38, 70 P.3d 35, 46. 
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Utah Code section 72-5-104(1) provides that a road can become "dedicated and 
abandoned" to the public by ten years continuous public use. That law must be interpreted, 
however, to avoid conflict with the private property rights guaranteed by both the Utah and 
United States constitutions.115 Section 22 of Article I of the Utah Constitution declares: 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution similarly states: "nor shall private 
property be taken for public use without just compensation." The only interpretation of 
section 72-5-104( 1) consistent with these constitutional protections is that a landowner may, 
through inaction, dedicate or abandon his or her property, but the public cannot take that 
property without compensation. A Louisiana court recognized this distinction, holding that 
the public authority could not take a road unless the landowner's knowing acquiescence in 
public use and maintenance "amounts to a tacit dedication by the landowner - a giving by 
the landowner rather than a taking by the public authority."116 The dedication statute is really 
only a rule of evidence that defines what constitutes abandonment or dedication to the public 
- it cannot give the public a right to take property without compensation. 
Consistent with the concept that a landowner can abandon but the public cannot take, 
the scope and width of the easement must be limited to that which the landowner abandoned. 
While a landowner might voice no objection to public use of a narrow path and thereby 
U5Thumwaldv. A.E., 2007 UT 38,14, 163 P.3d 623, 625; Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re 
Estate ofS.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, t 26, 144 P.3d 1083, 1091. 
U6Vaughn v. Williams, 345 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1977). 
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dedicate that path to the public, the landowner might have made strenuous objection to use 
of a wider path. The public cannot take a wider path than the landowner abandoned. 
Utah cases are generally consistent with this principle. The law was summarized by 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit as follows: 
A right of way is not tantamount to fee simple ownership of a 
defined parcel of territory. Rather, it is an entitlement to use 
certain land in a particular way. To convert a two-track jeep 
trail into a graded dirt road, or a graded road into a paved one, 
alters the use, affects the servient estate, and may go beyond the 
scope of the right of way. See [Sierra Club v.] Hodel, 848 F.2d 
[1068] at 1083 [(10th Cir. 1988)] ("surely no Utah case would 
hold that a road which had always been two-lane with marked 
and established fence lines, could be widened to accommodate 
eight lanes of traffic"); Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1,116 
P.2d 420,424 (Utah 1941) ("the use to which the way has been 
put measures the extent of the right to use";"[a] bridle path 
abandoned to the public may not be expanded, by court decree, 
into a boulevard"). This does not mean that no changes can ever 
be made, but that any improvements must be made in light of the 
traditional uses to which the right of way had been put, fixed as 
of October 21, 1976. Hodel, 848 F.2d at 1084.117 
While "the width of a public road is determined according to what is reasonable and 
necessary under all the facts and circumstances,"118 that width can only be the width 
necessary to accommodate the historical use. Any more expansive width would result in an 
unconstitutional taking of private land without compensation. 
The roads at issue are narrow, two-track paths. With the exception of the first two 
miles on the Haynes property which was recently improved and widened, the testimony at 
7S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735, 747-748 (10th Cir. 2005). 
lMemmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted). 
31 
trial established the roads were 8 to 10 feet wide. The historical use has been primarily 
limited to agricultural purposes. The roads are already of adequate width for their historical 
purposes, and no widening of the roads would be justified. Jacobs were able to use the roads 
in the current condition for large cement trucks, dump trucks, satellite transmission semi 
truck and trailer, and other large vehicles.119 There was no testimony showing that any 
greater width (than the current 8-10 feet) was needed. 
Jacob argued below, however, that the width should meet current development 
standards for a subdivision.120 This Court should clarify that the width of the road is limited 
to that necessary to accommodate historical use from 1880 to 1896. 
IV: THE HISTORICAL RECORDS DID NOT PROVIDE CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF TEN YEARS PUBLIC USE 
OF THE ROADS. 
A. The Controlling Evidence Was Documentary and Not Disputed; this Court Should 
Therefore Make Its Own Determination as to the Legal Effect of the Evidence. 
The trial court found a public road was created by use of the roads from 1880 to 
1896.121 Obviously, there were no witnesses who could testify from personal knowledge 
about that period, and the proof was thus primarily from documents.122 This Court is in as 
119E.g., transcript vol. I, 188-220. 
120£.g.,R-Haynes 1485-1487. 
121R-Haynes 1459. 
122R-Haynes 1441. 
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good a position as the trial court to interpret those documents, and may review the facts de 
This is consistent with the observation of the trial court: "It does not appear as if the 
! 
facts are in great dispute, but the legal consequences of those facts is where this dispute is 
centered."124 
The evidence regarding use of the Bench Road is marshaled as follows; the following 
subpoints show this evidence did not constitute clear and convincing evidence of continuous 
public use for ten years: 
Evidence that roads and physical signs of use existed. 
1875: The road appeared on maps and is described in survey notes beginning in 1875. 
Exhibits 101-105, 108-109; Transcript vol. I, 59-68. The road is in substantially the same 
location as at present. Exhibit 296. 
1893: A vacant cabin is reflected in the survey notes from October 1893. The cabin 
is located at point K.125 Transcript vol. I, 61. 
mJones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Bench v. Bechtel Civil & 
Minerals, Inc., 758 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
124R-Haynes 1403. See also R-Haynes 1440: "The court finds and concludes in this 
case there are very, very few credibility determinations at issue of any importance. Almost 
all the witnesses are found to be honest and credible and they saw events as they believed 
them to be from their perspective. Almost none of the court's decisions are governed by 
credibility determinations." 
125All references to a physical point and letter refer to the Exhibit 117 map, a copy of 
which appears in the appendix to this brief. 
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Exhibit 105, the field notes of an 1893 survey, notes a corral at point D. Transcript 
vol. I, 61. The survey notes also indicate a wagon road and old sawmill site at point A. 
Transcript vol. I, 64. 
1894: The 1894 maps show the Bench Road existed, the Middle Fork Road existed 
to the point where it enters section 33 near Boyer Lake, and the East Fork Road existed from 
the fork on the Bench Road to the middle of section 8. Exhibits 110-112; transcript vol. I, 
67-70. 
A cabin existed at point K. Exhibit 111; transcript vol. I, 69. 
An old sawmill existed at point A, and a corral existed at point D. Exhibit 112; 
transcript vol. I, 70. 
The Randall cabin existed at point F. Exhibit 112, transcript vol. I, 71. 
A meadow or irrigated field existed at point G. Exhibit 112, transcript vol. I, 71. 
An old sawmill existed at point I. Exhibit 112, transcript vol. I, 71. 
Evidence of use. 
1863: L. L. Randall owned and operated a sawmill "about two miles up from Pine 
Cliff, in the East Fork of Calk [sic] Creek." Exhibit 137, control number JC 2366; transcript 
vol. I, 93. Merrett T. Staley also operated a sawmill. Id. The Randall sawmill was built in 
1863, and the "lumber was used extensively in the construction and enlarging of Fort 
Bridger, and homes in Coalville." Exhibit 142; transcript vol. I, 96-97. The sawmill was 
operated for many years. Exhibit 158, control number JC 2587. 
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1865: Exhibit 131 reflects that on September 4, 1865, the county court granted a 
petition of L.L. Randall, Jacob Huffman, and others "to control saw timber on Chalk creek 
kanyon [sic]," and that "[t]he citizens shall have the privilege to haul logs to said mill and 
have them sawed on shares of one half." Transcript vol. I, 90-91. 
1883-1901: William Staley settled on a homestead at point E in July 1883 and resided 
there until at least 1901 when a patent was issued. Exhibit 119; transcript vol. I, 77-78. 
1883-1903: Leonard Randall settled on a homestead at point F in July 1882 and 
resided there until at least 1903 when a patent was issued. Exhibit 120; transcript vol. I, 80-
82. 
1884: Exhibit 129 shows that water was being put to beneficial use in 1884, with a 
point of diversion near the Red Hole area. Transcript vol. I, 89. 
1893: George Huff diverted water for a ditch in 1893. Exhibit 130; Transcript vol. 
1,90. 
1894-1898: John Clark maintained a dipping corral at point H; the dipping corral 
existed in 1894. Exhibits 105, 112; transcript vol. I, 63, 71-72. A newspaper article on 
August 8,1895 stated that 40,000 sheep had been dipped at the dipping corral and that Clark 
expected to dip 100,000 sheep. Exhibit 150; transcript vol. I, 102. A newspaper article 
October 13, 1896, stated about over 100,000 sheep had been dipped that season. Exhibit 
151; transcript vol. 1,102-103. A newspaper article dated June 22,1898, stated that dipping 
would commence at Clark's dipping corral on or about the first of July. Exhibit 152; 
transcript vol. I, 103. 
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1895-1901: George Huff settled on a homestead at point B in December 1893, and 
resided there until at least 1901 when a patent was issued. Exhibit 121; Transcript vol. I, 83. 
1896-1903: Charles Saxton settled on a homestead at point C in July 1896 and resided 
there until at least October 1903 when a patent was issued. Exhibit 122; Transcript vol. I, 
84. 
1913: The Summit County commission authorized the expenditure of county funds 
for improvement of the Sage Brush Flat road in Chalk Creek, which the trial court found to 
be the Bench Road as described in this litigation. Exhibit 244; transcript vol. Ill, 561; R-
Haynesl4191J41. 
Testimony not specific as to date 
Sam Banner hunted bear and other animals in the Red Hole area. Exhibit 139; 
transcript vol. I, 94-96. 
Sheep men and sawmill people would attend functions at the Upton ward. Exhibit 
142, control number JC 2443; transcript vol. I, 97. 
Mrytle Rigby, bom December 3,1888, homesteaded in the Chalk Creek area in 1916. 
A history written in 1983 states: "Sundays were especially fun and exciting at Chalk Creek 
Ranch in the summer. More frequently than not there were city visitors. A bountiful lunch 
was prepared. Favorite horses were saddled, a team harnessed to the white-top surrey, and 
everyone was off to Blue Lake or Bear River to fish." Exhibit 160 at JC 1649; transcript vol. 
I, 109. 
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The minutes of the Summit County commissioners for September 2,1947, state that 
the fish and game warden "asked that an investigation be made as to the status of the Road 
through Howard Haynes Property, and leading to Blue Lake, as Mr. Haynes had closed the 
road to the public and the same had been used generally by the public for a long time." 
Exhibit 133; transcript vol. I, 92. The minutes state the matter will be taken up with the 
county attorney, but there is no indication an investigation occurred or what the result might 
have been of any investigation. Id. 
B. Private Property Rights Are Constitutionally Protected and Can Be Overcome Only 
by Clear and Convincing Evidence. 
The trial court here stated, "This case is a very, very difficult case for the court and 
it is not a clear cut case at all."126 For the reasons expressed below, Haynes respectfully 
submit that the evidence in this case was not clear and convincing, and did not establish 
continuous public use for the required ten years. 
Private property rights have constitutional protection. As stated above, Section 22 of 
Article I of the Utah Constitution declares: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation." The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution similarly states: "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation." 
Consistent with the constitutional prohibition of taking private property without just 
compensation, "a party seeking to establish dedication and abandonment under this statute 
'R-Haynes 1439. 
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[Utah Code § 72-5-104] bears the burden of doing so by clear and convincing evidence."127 
Additionally, the trial court is required to view the evidence in these cases in light of the 
"presumption" that exists "in favor of the property owner."128 
The reason for requiring this higher standard of proof in public road cases is clear. 
As explained by the Utah Supreme Court, "[t]he law does not lightly allow the transfer of 
property from private to public use This higher standard of proof is demanded since the 
ownership of property should be granted a high degree of sanctity and respect."129 In an 
earlier public roads case, the Utah Supreme Court similarly stressed that "[w]here individual 
property rights are at stake, we must not treat such rights lightly."130 
Haynes respectfully submit that claims based on conj ecture and inference from ancient 
records cannot meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence. A journal entry 
indicating, for example, that a person ended up at Blue Lake does not clearly and 
convincingly establish that the person followed a particular primitive, rough road to get there. 
This is particularly true if the individual was likely riding a horse or hiking such that travel 
across open meadows off the road could have occurred. The court in Southern Utah 
niWasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, f 9, 179 P.3d 768, 773 (citations 
omitted). 
mDraper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097,1099 (Utah 1995) (quoting Leo 
M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211, 213 (Utah 1981)). 
129Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099. 
^Petersen v. Combe, 20 Utah 2d 376, 438 P.2d 545, 546 (1968). 
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Wilderness Alliance v. BLMm noted that "litigants are driven to the historical archives for 
documentation of matters no one had reason to document at the time."132 These records 
simply do not have the level of detail on each element of a dedication claim that is 
constitutionally required to justify impairing private property rights. 
C. Occasional Limited Use by Homesteaders, Hunters, and Other Such Persons Does 
Not Create a Public Road. 
Relying on the Colorado case oiLee v. Masner,133 the trial court held that use of the 
road by even one homesteader is sufficient to make the road public. Lee, however, is 
inconsistent with Utah case authority. 
Utah "case law has distinguished between use of a road by owners of adjoining 
property and by the general public."134 Homestead squatters, while not yet full owners of 
property, nonetheless have possessory rights that distinguish them from the general public. 
"[A] party settling upon unsurveyed government land who in good faith complies with the 
statutory requirements, is entitled, as against subsequent settlers to pre-empt the land[.]"135 
A memorandum decision of this Court confirms that use by a homesteader does not create 
a public road: 
131425F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005). 
132/</. at 742. 
13345 P.3d 794 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). 
^Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). 
135
 Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. Telluride Power Transmission Co. ,23 Utah 22, 
27, 63 P. 995, 1000(1900). 
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Although the section twelve road was used by a family 
that homesteaded the property long ago, and the section eighteen 
road appeared on various maps, this evidence does not meet the 
burden required for creating a public highway, whether as a 
"county road" or otherwise.136 
Lee also varies from Utah law in its claim that use by one person is sufficient to create 
a public road.137 For example, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that use by "occasional 
squirrel hunters, fishermen, and the like" and "intermittent private use of the quarry leases 
and their employers, and by an occasional hunter or fisherman" was not sufficient to create 
a public road.138 Similarly, faced with evidence that a way of travel had been used by a 
nursery company and its customers, the court held: "While we do not attempt to here define 
what evidence is necessary to establish a highway by virtue of an acceptance from the public 
domain or by dedication from the owner, we agree with the trial court that the evidence of 
such limited use for such a small section is not sufficient."139 In contrast, the court affirmed 
a public road where "the road was unquestionably used very extensively by the general public 
for general purposes," and was used for trailing sheep "not by a few persons, but by many 
persons, and it involved more than the mere driving of animals on the road."140 The court 
u6Koller v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 346, U 6. 
13745P.2dat795. 
^Thomson v. Condas, 27 Utah 2d 129, 132, 493 P.2d 639, 641 (1972). 
™Oregon S. L. R.R. v. Murray City, 2 Utah 2d 427, 435, 277 P.2d 798, 803 (1954). 
mLindsay Land & Live Stock Co. v. Churnos, 75 Utah 384, 391, 285 P. 646, 648 
(1929). 
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further commented that "[i]f the claim rested alone upon the use of the road for sawmill 
purposes, or for mining purposes, or for the trailing of sheep, the question would be more 
difficult,"141 thus indicating those uses alone would likely not be sufficient. 
Other states similarly require that the use be significant. "Nevertheless, the public use 
necessary to constitute acceptance of the offer to dedicate under [R.S. 2477] cannot be a use 
that is merely occasional and not substantial."142 Casual and desultory use is not sufficient.143 
Likewise inadequate is evidence of infrequent and sporadic use by sightseers, hunters, and 
trappers of a dead-end road running into wild, unenclosed, or uncultivated land.144 The mere 
fact that a road or trail existed and was traveled by an individual "perhaps once a year, twice 
a year, three times, not over that; maybe some years not at all" will not create a public road.145 
It is therefore clear under Utah law that while the public need not consist of "a great 
many persons,"146 the use does need to be by significantly more than one and needs to be 
more than infrequent use. The infrequent, occasional use described in this case does not 
meet the requirement of continuous public use. 
mId. 
l42Luchetti v. Bandler, 108 N.M. 682, 684 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989). 
™Kirk v. Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 284, 119 P.2d 266, 268 (1941). 
l44Hamerly v. Denton, 359 P.2d 121, 125 (Alaska 1961). 
l45Moulton v. Irish, 218 P. 1053, 1054 (Mont. 1923). 
146Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, \ 10, 179 P.3d 768, 773. 
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D. The Evidence Did Not Establish Continuous Public Use of the East Fork Road. 
While Haynes do not agree with the trial court's decision about the Bench Road, 
Haynes must acknowledge there is some evidence that members of the public used that road. 
The sufficiency of that evidence is addressed below. With respect to the East Fork Road, 
however, there is really no competent evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, of 
public use for the requisite ten continuous years, prior to 1896 or at any time thereafter. 
The evidence of use on the East Fork Road is marshaled as follows: 
Exhibit 105, the field notes of an 1893 survey, notes a corral at point D.147 The survey 
notes also indicate a wagon road and old sawmill site at point A.148 
Exhibit 112, an 1894 map, has a reference to an old sawmill at point A, and a corral 
at point D.149 The map also shows a road that forks off the Bench Road and continues to 
almost the middle of section 8. 
Exhibit 121 is a homestead application filed by George Huff in 1895. The homestead 
is at point B.150 The application states Huff built a house in December 1893, and established 
residence in November 1894. The affidavit accompanying the application states Huff resided 
Transcript vol. I, 61. 
'Transcript vol. I, 64. 
'Transcript vol. I, 70. 
'Transcript vol. I, 83. 
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there continuously until at least January 12,1901 except for a four month absence in 1987.151 
A patent was issued in June 1901.152 
Exhibit 122 is the homestead application filed by Charles Saxton. The homestead is 
at point C.153 The application states Saxton settled on the homestead in July 1896 and resided 
there with only a few absences until January 1903,154 and a patent was issued in October 
1903.155 
Exhibit 130 is a record of a claim of water diversion, showing George Huff diverted 
water for a ditch in 1893.156 
The minutes of the Summit County commissioners for September 2, 1947, state that 
the fish and game warden "asked that an investigation be made as to the status of the Road 
through Howard Haynes Property, and leading to Blue Lake, as Mr. Haynes had closed the 
road to the public and the same had been used generally by the public for a long time."157 
The minutes state the matter will be taken up with the county attorney, but there is no 
indication an investigation occurred or what the result might have been of any 
151Exhibit 121, control number JC 2347. 
{52Id., control number JC 2351. 
153Transcript vol. I, 84. 
154Exhibit 122, control number JC 2327. 
l55Id. control number JC 2333. 
l56Transcript vol. I, 90. 
157Exhibit 133; transcript vol. I, 92. 
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investigation.158 More critically, there is no evidence that the road at issue was the East Fork 
Road - the trial court here found that there was no public portion of the road leading to Blue 
Lake.159 
This evidence, at best, shows there was once a sawmill, but gives no indication of the 
years of use or even who used it. It also shows homesteaders present, but they were not 
members of the public as explained above. There was a corral, but no evidence of when or 
by whom it was used. There was a road, but no evidence of who used it or when. The 
evidence was not clear and convincing of continuous use by the public for any ten year 
period. This Court should reverse the trial court's decision that a portion of the East Fork 
Road is a public road. 
E. Use of Wild, Uncultivated, and Unenclosed Land Is Presumed Permissive. 
Haynes acknowledges there is some evidence that members of the public traveled over 
the Bench Road and across the Jacobs property en route to Boyer Lake (known then as one 
of the Blue Lakes), but assert that such use should be considered permissive and not of the 
character that results in a permanent right for all members of the public to use the road. In 
the late 1800's time period addressed by much of the evidence, half of the land at issue (all 
odd-numbered sections) was owned by the railroad and not subject to the RS 2477160 
mId. 
159R-Haynes 1451-1452 U 29. 
160Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, § 8, 14 Stat. 251, 253 codified).at 43 U.S.C. § 932, 
repealed by Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), Pub.L. No. 94-579 § 
706(a), 90 Stat. 2743 (commonly called R.S. 2477). 
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statutory invitation to create a public road. For such land, permissive use of the land would 
not create a public road.161 Cases from several jurisdictions establish that "there is no 
presumption of adversity where the land over which an easement is sought is wild, 
uncultivated or unenclosed because of the theory of neighborly accommodation and problems 
of notice."162 
A recent Maine decision acknowledged a general rule that open and continuous use 
of a way is presumed to be adverse, but then stated: "However, application of such a 
presumption to a public, prescriptive easement claim for recreational uses is inappropriate 
when that claim applies to open fields or woodlands and the ways traversing them."163 
Utah law is consistent with this principle. In an early decision the court stated: 
But if the land of which that covered by the road is a part is 
uninclosed, and not appropriated to any special use by the 
owner, the fact that the public travels over it occasionally, as the 
custom may be to cross vacant and unoccupied lands without 
obj ection from the owner, does not authorize any inference of an 
intention to dedicate.164 
mUtah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, ^  19, 179 P.3d 775, 782. 
1627 Thompson on Real Property § 60.03(b)(6)(viii) at p. 519 (2nd Thomas ed. 2006). 
Accord Weihl v. Wagner, 569 N.E.2d 297, 299 (111 Ct. App. 1991); Corruthers v. King, 363 
S.W.2d 413, 414 (Ark. 1963). 
l63Lyons v. Baptist Sch. of Christian Training, 804 A.2d 364, 370 (Me. 2002). 
164Wilson v. Hull, 7 Utah 90, 92, 24 P. 799, 800 (Utah 1890). 
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Another early case, although addressing an easement by necessity, recognized that the 
rules applicable to open land must be different than those governing established 
communities: 
This community, as disclosed by the evidence, during the years 
involved, was in process of settlement, and the whole country 
was but recently largely open, and the traveler free to follow 
almost any course that promised to bring him most easily to his 
journey's end. Here we find wheel tracks in almost any 
direction without system, and without regard to section lines or 
property rights. When, in a community so situated, the time 
arrives for the fencing of fields and the establishing of 
permanent roads and rights of way, the strict application of this 
rule would, in many cases, produce fantastic results quite 
inconsistent with justice.165 
This is consistent with the testimony presented in this case. For example, Fern Boyer, 
born in 1928 and 80 years old at the time of trial,166 testified: "It was just like wide open 
country. There were no gates, no fences. Everyone seemed to enjoy everyone else and do 
whatever they wanted."167 The evidence showed a general attitude that the open lands could 
be freely traversed without seeking permission. Under these circumstances, it would be 
improper to apply any presumption that the use was adverse. If there were any such 
presumption, this Court should hold the presumption was rebutted by Boyers' own evidence 
that "everyone" freely traversed over property of others without ever seeking permission. 
l65Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 257, 161 P. 1127, 1133 (1916). 
166Transcript vol. 11,415. 
l67Transcript vol. II, 431. 
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Because the use was all permissive and not adverse, by permitted the use the owner 
(the railroad) did not thereby abandon the road to the public.168 
F. The Evidence Did Not Establish Ten Years Continuous Public Use of the Bench Road. 
The trial court found there was continuous public use from 1880 to 1896. There was 
no specific evidence of use in 1880; the first date after that was 1883, when William Staley 
and Leonard Randall settled their homesteads. George Huff settled his homestead in 1895, 
and Charles Saxton in 1896. The last of these four to receive a patent was Charles Saxton, 
in 1903, twenty years after the first of the group to settle. But, as set forth above, 
homesteaders are not members of the public. And, the initial visit by each homesteader to 
locate his homestead site is the type of casual, sporadic use that cannot ripen into a public 
right of way for all time. 
There is evidence that one sawmill operated on the Bench Road, but no evidence of 
how long it operated - only a claim that it operated "for many years." The sawmill was 
apparently constructed by permission of the county court, so the use was by permission. Use 
of the road by the business invitees of the sawmill is likewise permissive and does not count 
as use by members of the public.l69 More importantly, evidence that a sawmill existed at one 
point on the road is not clear and convincing evidence that the entire road was used - it only 
might show use up to the point of the sawmill. 
mUtah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12, If 19, 179 P.3d 775, 782. 
mSee Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097,1099 (Utah 1995); Luevano 
v. Maestas, 874 P.2d 788, 793 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994). 
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As with sawmills, evidence that John Clark maintained a dipping corral is not 
evidence of public use of the roads. There is no evidence that the sheep were driven along 
the roads, and even if they were, the use by a business invitee is not use by the public. 
There is evidence that sheepmen occasionally went to Upton or to Peter's Park, and 
evidence that townspeople occasionally went to the Blue Lakes. There is no evidence, 
however, as to exactly when or how often any of this happened. This is not clear and 
convincing evidence of continuous public use. 
Haynes acknowledged that roads existed on the property. The mere existence of 
roads, however, does not give rise to an inference that the roads were used by members of 
the public.170 The travelers that created the roads could have been adjoining landowners or 
others with documentary or prescriptive rights.171 
In addition, as argued above, this Court should hold that all use of the road in this 
wild, unenclosed area was presumed permissive. Such a presumption is consistent with the 
evidence that everyone freely went wherever they wanted. The law should not presume that 
such wanderings create public roads. 
This Court should hold that the evidence was not clear and convincing that the 
railroad (the owner of half the sections of land during the 1880 to 1896 time frame) 
abandoned the road to the public. There was no clear and convincing evidence of continuous 
mKoller v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 346, \ 6 (evidence that a road appeared on various 
maps "does not meet the burden required for creating a public highway")-
mSee Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995). 
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public use for any ten year period. This Court should hold that the Bench Road was not a 
public road. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should hold there was no clear and convincing evidence of ten years 
continuous public use of the East Fork Road, and hold that no portion of the East Fork Road 
is public. The Court should hold that because the Bench Road was in wide, unenclosed 
territory, the use of the road by members of the public was presumed permissive and that use 
did not effect a dedication and abandonment of the road to the public. 
With respect to any segment of the road ultimately determined to be public, the Court 
should hold that the width of the road must be determined by a court; this Court should 
reverse the delegation of that decision to the County. The Court should direct the entry of 
judgment determining the road width is 18 feet in accordance with the trial court's findings. 
Alternatively, if the matter is remanded for further findings, this Court should clarify that the 
width should be such as will accommodate the use at the time the road became public and 
not for contemplated future uses beyond the historic use. 
DATED this ^ f f d a y of June, 2009. 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Brett D. C r a g i m ^ - — - ^ 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: ^ / 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C. 
Attorneys for Haynes parties 
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The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
March 4, 5, 6, 7, and 11, 2008. 
Haynes, Triple H, and Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users 
were present with and through Ray G. Martineau and Leslie Slaugh; 
Jacob-Christensen and Garff (Jacob) were present through Clark 
Waddoups, Tobi D. Potestio and Jonathan 0. Hafen; the Boyer 
parties (Fern Boyer, Gerald Boyer, Gregory Boyer and Alfred 
Blonquist, Trustee) were present with and through Brent Bohman; 
Summit County was present through Jami R. Brackin; and the State 
of Utah was present through Steven G. Schwendiman. Paul R. 
Poulsen for David B. Williams gave notice on March 3, 2008, that 
Williams would not appear at or participate in the trial. 
Timothy W. Blackburn for Bingham and Sons also filed a notice of 
non-appearance on March 4, 2008. 
A default certificate was entered April 18, 2006, against 
Stillman, the Halls, Helen Blonquist and Karel Snyder, who had 
written she has no property in Utah. 
BACKGROUND 
Haynes filed a complaint September 8/ 1998. It sought 
declaratory judgment quieting title in plaintiff to property and 
sought an adjudication of the rights and duties between Haynes 
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and Jacob. The original complaint originally named as defendants 
Catherine Christensen, LLC and Brian Garff and Summit County. It 
also sought to enjoin defendants from interfering with 
plaintiff's property rights. 
In briefest summary, it alleged Haynes and Jacob owned 
adjoining properties in an area of Summit County known as Chalk 
Creek, Jacob's property being west and south of plaintiff's 
property. Historically there has been a limited right of way 
across plaintiff's land to Jacob's land solely for agricultural 
and livestock purposes. In May 1984 the parties entered an 
agreement which resolved the nature of Jacob's rights concerning 
the easement and plaintiff's right to cross Jacob's property to 
maintain an irrigation ditch to convey water from Jacob's 
property to Haynes' property. As to Garff, Haynes asserted Garff 
had no right to passage over the Haynes property to reach a cabin 
or other improvements, nor did Jacob, as such passage was beyond 
the quit claim deed and agreement of 1984• As to Summit County, 
plaintiff asserts the county improperly designated a private 
roadway on Haynes' property as a public road. 
Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Haynes owns its property, 
has an easement over Jacob's property to service the irrigation 
ditch, that the roadway across Haynes' property is not public and 
is solely for agricultural purposes and uses by Jacob, and the 
court should enjoin Summit County from issuing building permits 
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pending the outcome of the case. 
On September 28, 1998, Summit County was dismissed by 
Haynes. 
For reasons not shown by the file no action was taken until 
service of process much later and Jacob filed an answer and 
counterclaim on May 15, 2003. It denied the essential 
allegations and alleges Garff owns a cabin on the Jacob property 
and Garff and Jacob have the right to use a road crossing the 
Haynes property. The road crosses Haynes property from SR 133, 
the Chalk Creek Road, and extends southward to Jacob's property 
and has been designated since 1978 as a Class D County road. It 
is the only feasible means of access to the Jacob property and 
has been in use since at least the mid- to late 1800s. 
Jacob first seeks a declaration that the road is a Class D 
County 'Road and is a public road and Haynes may not deny or 
restrict Jacob's use. Jacob also seeks a declaration that the 
road has been in existence since the 1800s, is commonly known as 
an RS 2477 road, in reference to an 1866 federal statute, 
repealed in 1976. The road was part of the public domain and the 
right of use may not be extinguished without proper state 
procedures for abandonment of a public road, 
Jacob secondly series tfa& alternate declaration the road is a 
public right of way. 
Third, Jacob seeks a declaration of easement by necessity. 
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Jacob alleges that before 1938, the Haynes and Jacob properties 
were owned jointly by the Wright Brothers, and that Jacob bought 
the property in 1938 and an easement was not expressly reserved 
to cross Haynes property. There is therefore an implied grant of 
easement by necessity for access to the Jacob property. 
Fourth, Jacob seeks a declaration that an easement was 
granted. This was granted February 3, 1939, and recorded, and it 
is subject to reasonable expansion when livestock grazing is not 
frequent and Jacob is entitled to enjoy the land for grazing, 
hunting, camping, and recreation, including construction of 
cabins to facilitate recreational use. 
Fifth Jacob alternatively seeks a declaration of 
prescriptive easement, that Jacob uses the road to access its 
property, that has occurred for more than 20 years, the use has 
been open and visible and without permission of Haynes. 
Sixth, Jacob alleges trespass, that Haynes has threatened to 
restrict Jacob's use and has locked gates. In 1997 Garff 
obtained a building permit to build a cabin on the Jacob 
property. Haynes then sought to restrict further approvals. 
Damages have followed because of plaintiff's conduct. 
Seventh, Jacob alleges the complaint of plaintiff is in bad 
faith. 
On June 4, 2003, Haynes replied to the counterclaim. 
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On August 27, 2003, Haynes moved to consolidate docket 
number 000600299 into this case. That case was entitled Triple H 
Ranch LC v Fern J. Boyer, Gerald G. Boyer, Gregory J, Boyer, 
Karel J. Snyder, H.S. Hansen, Helen Blonquist, Alfred C. 
Blonquist, Barbara Hall and Kevin Hall, defendants and third 
party plaintiffs vs. Haynes Land & Livestock, Lydia 0. Stillman 
dba Stillman Seven, Jacob Family Chalk Creek, Limited, Catherine 
B. Christensen, LLC, B.A. Bingham 6c Sons LLC, Chalk Creek 
Hoytsville Water Users Corp, Summit County, and State of Utah 
Department of Fire, Forestry and State Lands, third party 
defendants. The court issued a ruling and order September 23, 
2003, consolidating the cases as the-motion was4 unopposed. The 
court asked that an order be prepared but it was not provided 
until April 11, 2005, when it was signed by the court. Based on 
stipulation in June 2005 a scheduling order was entered. 
That complaint, now consolidated into this case, alleges 
Triple H has an undivided 11/36 interest in property between the 
Haynes and Jacob properties, Fern Boyer has 3/40, Gerald Boyer 
3/40, Gregory Boyer 1/10, Karel Snyder 1/36, J.S. Hansen 1/6, 
Helen Blonquist has a claimed interest in the property, Helen 
Blonquist as trustee has a 1/6 interest, Alfred Blonquist has an 
undivided 1/12 interest, and defendants Barbara and Kevin Hall 
may claim an interest in property in this Chalk Creek area in the 
west half of the Northeast quarter and the northeast quarter of 
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the Northwest quarter of Section 34 Township 2 North Range 8 
East, SL Base and Meridian, with exceptions. The complaint was 
under Title 78 Chapter 39 and seeks partition by sale for the 
common benefit of all parties who own that property. It further 
alleges the property involved consists of 5 non-contiguous 
parcels, no party has any easements, partition without sale is 
impossible, and plaintiff asks for a decree determining the 
respective rights of the parties to the property, that it be sold 
subject to exceptions, and that the proceeds be applied to costs 
and attorney fees and then distributed according to the interests 
of the parties in the property. 
An amended answer and counterclaim was filed in July 2005 
pursuant to stipulation. The amended answer and counterclaim 
adds as another counterclaim the named defendants in what was 
formerly docket no. 000600299. It contains the same basic causes 
of action but alleges against all defendants and seeks 
declaratory judgment (1) against all counterclaim defendants that 
the road is a public road from the 1800s and Class D county road 
since 1978 (2) that the road is an RS 2477 road as against all 
counterclaim defendants, (3) that Jacob has a prescriptive 
easement against all defendants except Suinftiit County for purposes 
of, among other things, livestock grazing, hunting, fishing, 
camping, snowmobiling, picnicking, recreational enjoyment, and 
the construction and use of cabins, (4) that Jacob has an 
-7-
001339 
easement by necessity against Haynes and the State because when 
the property was sold by Wright in about 1938 Jacob was given no 
express easement and Jacob has no other access and Jacob is 
landlocked without the easement. A conservation easement was 
granted to the State in 1999 on part of Haynes property and that 
easement was taken by the State subject to Jacob's right to use 
the road, (5) as against Haynes and the State that Jacob has been 
granted an express but restricted easement in 1939 to use the 
road for moving livestock and related equipment and the express 
easement is subject to reasonable expansion to accommodate 
reasonable use and enjoyment of the benefitted land as noted in 
the third cause of action above, and (6) trespass as against 
Haynes in that Jacob owns an interest in the land and Haynes is 
threatening and attempting to block access and is thus 
trespassing and Jacob and Garff have been damaged in an amount to 
be proven, and (7) Haynes is acting in bad faith by bringing its 
complaint and Jacob has had to defend against a frivolous suit. 
On August 1, 2005, Bingham, one of the consolidated third 
party defendants filed an answer. 
On August 4, 2005/ Summit County filed an answer to the 
counterclaim. 
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Williams filed an answer August 15, 2005, as well as a cross 
claim, Jacob answered November 9, 2005. 
The State filed an answer August 30, 2005, and Chalk Creek-
Hoytsville Water Users filed an answer on September 15, 2005. 
Other defendants filed various answers, some indicating no 
interest in the lawsuit. Hall filed a disclaimer April 6, 2006. 
Jacob filed a motion for partial summary judgment on 
September 8, 2006, as the next pleading. The court heard 
arguments on that matter on March 19, 2007, after extensions were 
granted for delayed briefing, and issued a Ruling and Order 
denying the motion on the public road issue on March 29, 2007. 
Since that time various discovery disputes have arisen and 
this trial date was scheduled. 
On October 3, 2007, the undersigned judge and court staff 
accompanied counsel and various others on a day-long journey to 
the property at issue, crossing the Haynes and Jacob properties 
whil^ ^ Otmaeland pthers pointed out various sites* That Afield 
trip" was not on the record though the court's clerk was present 
and made some minutes which are part of the file. The court, for 
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its own information and memory, took some photographs which it 
retains as an aid to recollection of the area. Those are not part 
of the record though numerous photographs taken by the parties 
were introduced and received at trial. 
On January 15, 2008, the parties stipulated that the trial 
would proceed on the issues dealing with the parties' rights to 
use of the roadways, and to defer trial of any other issues 
dealing with partition of the Boyer property until after this 
trial. 
On January 25, 2008, the court signed an order based on 
stipulation of the parties that Jacob Family Chalk Creek LLC be 
substituted as defendant, counterclaim plaintiff, and third party 
defendant in place of the previously named limited partnership. 
The court on January 30, 2008, denied the request of Haynes 
and the State to postpone the trial awaiting Utah Supreme Court 
rulings. In fact the Utah Supreme Court issued the anticipated 
rulings dealing with public roads on February 12, 2008. 
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
< 
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of counsel, received pre-trial briefs, visited the site, received 
post-trial briefs, and is fully advised- The court took the 
matter under advisement. 
It does not appear as if the facts are in great dispute, but 
the legal consequences of those facts is where this dispute is 
centered. 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The nature of the parties appears, without serious 
dispute, to be as follows. 
2. Plaintiffs are Haynes Land and Livestock, Triple H Ranch 
LC, and Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users. Haynes is a general 
partnership and owns property in Summit County. All property at 
issue is located in TIN R8E, T2N R8E, T2N R7E and T3N R7E, as 
described in Exhibit AA attached to Haynes Trial Brief. The 
Haynes property comprises just under 10,000 acres. 
Triple H is a limited liability company and it owns an 
undivided one third interest in the Boyer-Triple H property 
(Boyer property)in T2 R8 Section 34. Water Users is a 
corporation and it owns property also in Section 34. 
Jacob Family Chalk Creek LLC is a limited liability company 
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and Catherine B. Christensen LLC is as well, and each owns an 
undivided one half interest in the approximately 10,000 acres as 
fully described in Exhibit DD to plaintiffs' trial brief, land 
mostly to the west and south of the Haynes property. Throughout 
this decision the court will normally call the Jacot-Christensen 
entities "Jacob." That is not done to imply Jacob is more 
important than Christensen, but is simply shorter than writing 
Jacob-Christensen so frequently. On occasion, such as describing 
cabins, the court will use the Jacob cabin, or the Christensen 
cabin and so forth. Whenever "Jacob" is used, unless the context 
shows otherwise, the court is referring to the Jacob-Christensen 
entities and families. 
Garff is a family member of the Jacob entities who has 
attempted to build a cabin on the Jacob property. 
Bingham & Sons owns property between SR 133 and the Haynes 
property. Stillman owns property nearby. Fern Boyer, Gerald 
Boyer, Gregory Boyer, J.S. Hansen, and Alfred Blonquist own an 
undivided 2/3 interest in combination with Triple H of what is 
called the Boyer property in Section 34 T2 R8. 
Summit Count claims an interest in the Class D road and the 
State of Utah claims a grantee's right in the conservation 
easements involved or to be involved. 
3. This dispute concerns historic routes to travel across 
property owned by Haynes and whether that travel is over a public 
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road, whether that travel is permissible and governed by some 
form of easement, or whether access across Haynes' property is 
more limited. Other subsidiary issues abound concerning use by 
others as well. 
4. All references are to the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
and this land involves three townships, TIN, T2N or T3N, and 
Ranges 7E or 8E. Throughout, these will be short handed to Tl, 
T2, or T3, R7 or R8 together with the appropriate section number. 
From Coalville, Utah, the county seat of Summit County, 
heading basically eastward is SR 133, commonly called the Chalk 
Creek Road. That road travels easterly and eventually leads, over 
unimproved roads east of the area of concern in this case, to 
Wyoming and other areas of Utah. Leaving SR 133 approximately 18 
miles east of Coalville in a south easterly direction, Haynes and 
Jacob each own substantial property (approximately 10,000 acres 
each). The chain of titles will be discussed but in essence 
Haynes bought property closest to SR 133 in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Further removed from SR 133 Jacob also owns substantial property, 
and the Boyer parties own property consisting of substantially 
smaller acreage in a Section bounded by the Haynes property and 
the Jacob property. To get to their property Jacob has to cross 
the Haynes property, as do the Boyers to get to their property* 
Now disputes have arisen about the nature of that use and whether 
the routes traveled to gain access is a public road or whether 
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Haynes ownership of the property is subject to certain types of 
easements in favor of Jacob or Boyer. Up to the day of trial 
there evidently was an issue as to whether any access was allowed 
by Boyer and it is Haynes position still at trial Boyer has no 
easement to gain access to the Boyer property. 
5. From SR 133 a road crosses property owned by Bingham. 
That road goes for approximately one quarter mile and then leads 
onto the Haynes property as shown on X117 on T3 R7 Sec. 35. 
Interestingly, all involved including Haynes have used this road 
and Bingham, the owner, evidently has never attempted to stop 
such use from SR 133 and Bingham did not participate in this 
trial. All involved have evidently treated this first quarter 
mile or so as always being open to the public. The road shown on 
that map X117 shows where the current course of that road in 
orange. The road at that point is commonly called the Bench Road 
or historically Sage Brush Flats, and it travels onto Haynes 
property in T3 R7 Section 35. There is now a locked gate and 
fence with several signs basically stating No Trespassing or 
Private Property. That gate is in Section 35 as above. The 
particulars of the beginnings of those signs and gate are in some 
dispute. The road at issue then travels further onto and through 
Hayings property easterly onto T3 R7 Section 3$, then turns 
southerly onto T2 R8 Section 1. It splits in T2 R8 Section 7, 
and the "main" or Bench Road at issue goes southerly still across 
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Haynes property through T2 R8 Sections 7 and 18 until the Jacob 
property begins at T2 R8 Section 19 immediately south of Section 
18. At that point the road has commonly (and will be herein) 
called the Middle Fork Road. The land becomes more mountainous 
and less level. Thus, at T2 R8 the property line between Haynes 
and Jacob is the section line between Sections 18 and 19. The 
Middle Fork Road continues south easterly on Jacob's property 
through T2 R8 Sections 19, 20, 29, 32, 33 and into Tl R8 Section 
4, which is toward the south end of the Jacob property. At 
approximately that area Jacob and Christensen have built some 
cabins to be discussed below. The road then travels north 
easterly back through T2 R8 Section 33 and onto T2 R8 Section 34 
where lakes are located as discussed in the next paragraph. The 
Boyer property at issues is all within T2 R8 Section 34, bounded 
on the north, south and west by Jacob property and on the north 
and east by the Haynes property. 
6* At the split in T2 R8 Section 7 back to the north what is 
called the East Fork Road (or East Fork Loop) travels easterly 
and somewhat southerly, across T2 R8 Sections 8, 9, and 15 and 
then turns south and crosses T2 R8 Sections 22, 23, 26 and 27, 
all still on Haynes property, where it veers a bit west onto the 
Jacob property at T2 R8 Section 27, just north of and near what 
are called Joyce Lake and Boyer Lake or Boyer Reservoir located 
within T2 R8 Section 34. The road from the East Fork then 
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continues southerly across the Boyer property in T2 R8 Section 
34, crosses the reservoir and travels south westerly onto the 
Jacob property. Thus, considering the Middle Fork Road until it 
reaches the Boyer property, and the East Fork Road until it 
reaches the Boyer property, the named aspects of this road "meet" 
and a loop is formed. The entire road has in the past been 
called the East Fork of Chalk Creek, as it is in the East Fork 
Chalk Creek drainage, but the terminology used in this paragraph 
will be used throughout this Memorandum Decision to mean the 
Bench Road on the Haynes property from the northern beginning 
point in T3 R7 Section 35 until the property line between Haynes 
and Jacob at T2 R8 Sections 18 and 19. Thereafter the road will 
be called the Middle Fork from T2 R8 Section 19 all through the 
Jacob property until it reaches the Boyer property on T2 R8 
Section 34. On the Boyer property the road will be called the 
Boyer road. Continuing from there at the north end of the Boyer 
property in Section 34 T2 R8 on the Haynes property the road will 
be called the East Fork Road until it "rejoins" the Bench Road in 
T2 R8 Section 7. 
7. There is another road, which the court will call the West 
Fork Road, about which there seems little dispute. It leaves the 
Bench Road on Haynes property in T2 R8 Section 18 and branches 
off to the west and mostly south, onto Jacob property at T2 R8 
Section 19 and then remains on the Jacob property to the southern 
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border of Jacob's property at Tl R7 Section 12. 
8. The issues in this case concern the entire loop. Jacob 
and Boyers and Summit County contend the entire loop is a public 
road, including the Bench Road, Middle Fork Road, Boyer Road, and 
East Fork Road. Haynes and the State of Utah assert none of it 
is a public road but there is a prescriptive easement in favor of 
Jacob but none in favor of Boyer. 
9. At the beginning of trial plaintiffs conceded for the 
first time in an oral stipulation that Jacob .could have an 
agricultural and recreational easement over Haynes' property 
along the Bench Road and East Fork Road consistent with the 
historical use including oil and gas exploration but that use 
does not include use for the fourth, or Garff, cabin erected on 
the Jacob property, to be discussed below. Jacob accepted the 
stipulation but of course urged it does not go far enough and 
Jacob has additional rights of use and Jacob claims the entire 
road is public. 
10. Most of this land was once owned by the Wright Brothers 
who conveyed various portions at various times to both Haynes and 
the predecessors of Jacob. In the mid 1930s various parcels were 
conveyed as shown on X3Q0. The portions conveyed to Wasatch" 
Livestock later basically became the Jacob property. 
11. In 1932 Haynes, through Howard Hayes Sr, acquired the 
northern half of Section 36, T3 R7, as well as T2 R8 Sections 9, 
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15, 22, 23, 26, 35 as well as the eastern half of Section 27, 
some of Section 34 except the Boyer property, and the eastern 
half of Section 3 Tl R8. Thus, Haynes bought in 1932 what is the 
northern portion of its current property, approximately 6200 
acres more or less. Thus, the Bench Road crossed Haynes property 
only on Section 36 of T3 R7. The remainder of the Bench Road, 
Section 35 of T3 R7, T2 R7 Section 1, T2 R8 Sections 7 and 18, 
went across land owned by others, not Haynes, until Haynes bought 
those portions, along with the southern half of Section 8 T2 R8 
in about 1941. Specifically, as shown on X204, Haynes bought the 
south half of Section 36 T3 R7 and T2 R7 Section 1 in 1940 and 
Sections 7, 17, and 18 and most of Section 8 T2 R8 in 1941. 
12. Triple H and the Boyers own undivided interests in 
Section 34 T2 R8. The land surrounds the Boyer Reservoir in 
Section 34 T2 R8. X116 shows the non-contiguous nature of the 
Boyer property within Section 34 T2 R8. The property basically 
surrounds the Boyer Reservoir owned and operated by the Chalk 
Creek-Hoytsville Water Users. The Boyers owned the land on which 
the Boyer Reservoir sits in Section 34 T2 R8, and it was formerly 
the Boyer Lake, one. >of three lakes comprising the Blue Lakes. 
The Boyers in 1903 filed a notice of appropriation for storage of 
water in a reservoir. The Boyer family received patent in 1914 to 
the Boyer property at issue and conveyed some of it to the Chalk 
Creek Reservoir Company for purposes of the reservoir. That 
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entity conveyed approximately 83 acres to the Chalk Creek-
Hoytsville Water Users. Ax right of way was acquired in 1934 from 
the Wright Brothers. X6. After conveying the reservoir land to 
what is now known as the Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users, 
Boyers retained the land around the Boyer Reservoir as shown on 
X116. Triple H was formed in 2000 to purchase some of that land 
and now owns an approximate 1/3 undivided interest in what is 
called herein the Boyer property in Section 34. 
13. Haynes thus owns the land over which the Bench Road and 
the East Fork Road travel, and Haynes claims there are only three 
exceptions to Haynes record title: (1) the stipulated 
prescriptive easement in favor of Jaoob, (2) the easement created 
by the deeds, X6-X9, for limited livestock usage, and (3) an 
easement for the Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users (Water Users) 
to construct and maintain the reservoir/ Boyer Reservoir. 
14. Jacob bought its property, which again is to the south 
and west of Haynes property, from Wasatch Livestock, which was 
run by Irv Jacob. The Jacob property is again owned by the LLC 
and the Christensen LLC as equal undivided interest owners. It 
was purchased in the name of Jacob and Christensen in October 
1938. 
15. Once adquired the properties tretg bjasiealiy- v&n and 
managed by the parents of the current disputants. Howard Haynes 
Sr ran the Haynes property and his son and sibling Shirley 
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MacFarlane now basically operate the Haynes Land and Livestock 
LLC. Joe Jacob, the son of Irv Jacob, basically ran and operated, 
along with his siblings, the Jacob property during the time 
Howard Haynes, Sr, operated the Haynes property. Howard Haynes 
Sr. died in 1979. The testimony did not show when Joe Jacob 
died. The issues have arisen, as is always the case, in more 
recent times now that the "original" owners are not involved. 
16. For the basically 40 years Haynes Sr operated the ranch 
sheep and cattle grazed the area, some belonging to Haynes, some 
under lease, and various wildlife operations were allowed to use 
the property under contract as well. Beginning in about 1978 
Haynes allowed his property to be used as what was called a 
Posted Hunting Units. Various "outfitters" or companies would 
lease the land and charge customers to buy permits to hunt for a 
fee. Those people who hunted under the PHU, which later became 
Cooperative Wildlife Management Units, or CWMUs, were allowed on 
the property since 1978 until the present, on the Haynes 
property, to hunt deer, elk and other wildlife. Those lessees 
guarded the gates and checked during hunting season (basically 
August through October), as best they could, to determine that 
those on the Haynes land had permits. Some people, those who drew 
public permits, were guided. During that time frame perhaps 100 
people a year counting guests used the property of Haynes. There 
were permits for on average 40-50 animals per year, and two could 
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go in the hunting party and others could stay in the campgrounds. 
They could bring RVs, ATVs, tents, campers, horses, and so forth. 
Most of the property is not fences though some is. Haynes has 
several "cross fences" on its property and some gates protected 
by "cattle guards." There is a fence between some of the Haynes 
and Jacob property at Sections 18-19 as discussed herein. 
17. Jacob has also leased its lands, or portions thereof, 
for various others to run sheep and other livestock, as well as 
their own sheep and livestock in the past. Jacob has built 
cabins on their property as well. These uses will be discussed 
further below. 
18. The court intends to find facts chronologically to 
explain its conclusions. To begin much before this litigation 
before statehood in 1896 all of these lands belonged to the 
United States and were part of the public domain. The "land use 
policy" of the United States was that the lands could be used by 
about anyone for about any purposes without permits, permission, 
or concern for the finite nature of resources. People could 
timber and vhunt and graze livestock without regard to about 
anything. The even numbered sections were public land and the 
odd sections were public land until 1869 when they were acquired 
by the railroads. According to the title examination, X35, title 
to almost all of these relevant sections in this area vested in 
the State of Utah upon achieving statehood in 1896, and various 
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patents were granted to railroads as well and some lots were 
selected by Utah for various purposes such as a reform school, a 
permanent reservoir, and other purposes. There was no evidence 
that the railroad ever did anything with any of the sections 
involved in this area and the ownership of the railroads ceased 
just after 1900. 
19. Jacob claims the historical evidence shows the entire 
road, the entire loop involved is a public road under law and 
Haynes asserts it is not. Many historical documents, all hearsay 
but admissible under varying exceptions, were received and have 
been reviewed. 
20. Many historical documents were received, plaintiffs 
having stipulated they were admissible as far as being authentic 
and being exceptions to the hearsay rule. Plaintiffs objected as 
they were not relevant given that they could not produce 
sufficient proof by the necessary quantum of proof that this road 
was a public road. The court allowed admission of the documents 
and will briefly summarize as part of its findings those most 
heavily relied on by Jacob. 
21. A probate court entry from March of 1862 shows someone 
requested permission to take timber out of "East Kanyon" and to 
make a i^ oad. The court finds this is not convincing that this 
was in the drainage area of the East Fork of Chalk Creek but it 
does show that the public was, at that time, enabled to obtain 
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timber at will from the public lands. 
22. In 1865 a probate court docket minute entry shows 
approval was given for persons to take timber from Chalk Creek 
and have a saw mill. Again that does not demonstrate to this 
court by clear and convincing evidence this road at issue was 
involved as Chalk Creek could be any of the many miles now called 
Chalk Creek. It again shows some evidence, however, that the 
public was using the public lands. That court entry showed L.L. 
Randall and Jacob Huffman wanted a saw mill and those names will 
be found later herein. A 1947 historical text, X137, shows at 
page 139 that L.L. Randall had one of the first saw mills two 
miles from Pine Cliff, and that is in this area. Pine Cliff is 
along SR 133 just east and north of where this Bench Road leaves 
SR 133. Randall's homestead, discussed later, was along Bench 
Road in T2 R8 Section 18. X158 confirms Huffman operated a saw 
mill on the East Fork. 
23. Court minute entries from December 1866 and 1867 show 
two other requests in "Echo Kanyon" and Cache Cove for a "herd 
ground." This is not convincing to the court as being in this 
immediate area though it again shows the public nature of the 
public lands and general area. 
24. Official government surveys from the time are convincing 
to the court. X109 shows quite clearly the area of T3 R7 Section 
35, where the current Bench Road leaves SR 133 going southward. 
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Other maps and notes from this 1874 survey (the survey was in 
1873 and the resulting map from 1874, so those dates are largely 
interchangeable), combined with the stipulated expert report of 
Matthew Liapis, X296, show that there was a road in 1874 along 
what is now called the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road. 
25. In summary, that expert report shows Liapis attempted to 
determine if the 1873 and 1893 surveys described herein 
correspond to the current road at issue. He used the survey maps 
from 1874 and 1894. He consulted other experts, he toured the 
area and used other filed survey notes. He concluded the maps 
from the 1800s show the road then was substantially similar to 
the current Bench Road and Middle Fork Road with some fairly 
minor variations. He noted the surveyors in that time often did 
not venture into the interior of a section but only noted the 
roads along the section boundaries and basically "filled in" the 
area where the road probably went in the interior of a section. 
26. The survey notes from 1873 (the 1874 survey map) show a 
saw mill along the East Fork, T2 R8 Section 7, shown on X117 at 
Point A. 
27. A probate court minute entry of 1869 shows U.S. 
Surveyors were in Chalk Creek and th£ court asked a group of men 
to assist. X242. 
28. A territorial map from 1874 and 1875 shows a *saw mill" 
in this rough vicinity of these properties but it is impossible 
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to tell from that map precisely where the noted saw mill was 
located. XI63, XI64. 
29. In a court minute entry of 1879 L.L. Randall and others 
sought permission to divert water in Chalk Creek. X. 234. 
30. L.W. Randall applied for a homestead in 18 96, indicating 
he had been living there since 1885, and he had improved the 
property and was he given a patent in 1903. X. 120. That is shown 
on Point F in X117 in Section 18 near the Bench Road. 
31 . In 1895 W.H. Staley applied for a homestead in Section 
18 T2 R8, indicating he had resided there since 1883, and he made 
improvements and irrigated and built corrals and such and he was 
given a patent in 1901.1 That is shown as being near the Bench 
Road on X117 at Point E in Section 18 T2 R8. 
32. A U.S. Survey Sectional and Mineral map of 1875 shows a 
cabin where Point K on X117 is shown, near the current Middle 
Fork Road on the southern end of the Jacob property. 
33. In 1895 George Huff applied for a homestead, indicating 
*While these accounts of this time and place fascinate most 
and may cause many to wish for those "good old days'' when a 
person could begin living in an area and create a homestead 
there obviously was a down side. A newspaper article from July 
1886 demonstrates that perhaps those days, while they had their 
glory and glamor, were not all so good. William Staley, 
according to the report, in the course of 10 days lost two sons 
and a daughter to XAthat dreadful disease diphtheria," The article 
states "The unfortunate family a short time ago had a new home 
burnt to the ground. Their lot seems more than human nature can 
bear.'' William Staley's brother, M.H. Staley a few days later 
lost two children, ages 3 and 5, to the disease. All 5 deaths 
were within the space of two weeks. 
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he had been living there since 1894, and he was granted a patent 
in 1901. X, 121. That was in Section 8 T2 R8, at Point B on X117. 
34. A court minute entry of 1894 indicated the prosecuting 
attorney should prosecute anyone who has been blocking public 
highways in any of the canyons in Summit County which have been 
used for 7 years. This does not directly relate to this area but 
again shows the public nature of the canyons to some extent. 
35. A Coalville Times newspaper article from August 1895 
indicated that about 40,000 sheep had been "dipped" and about 
100,000 were expected at Clark's corral. These numbers were to 
some extent corroborated by X401-405, which showed at Coalville 
(the county seat) the tax records for 1993 show some 200,000 
sheep were taxed as having been brought into Summit County for 
summer grazing. This is some corroboration that a large number 
of sheep were in the area but does not show the number of sheep 
specifically in Chalk Creek. Another article from the next year, 
1896, also indicated 100,000 sheep were dipped at Clark's. 
Clark's dipping corral was in T2 R8 Section 19, now on the Jacob 
property, very near the Middle Fork Road shown on X117 at J. 
Dipping of sheep occurred by having the sheep in essence "bathed" 
in a chemical, creosote, to keep the flies off them. 
36. Charles Saxton applied for a homestead in Section 8 Ts 
R8 indicating he had moved there in 1896. He was later given a 
patent. X. 122. That is in Section 8 T2 R8 south of the current 
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East Fork Road. 
38. Various news articles from the late 1890s show various 
people had killed bear in the East Fork of Chalk Creek (this 
entire area) but none show the specific use of any particular 
roads. Those articles show use by persons in the area on public 
lands but are not convincing that any particular road was used. 
39. A USGS survey map of 1903 shows the Bench Road and the 
Middle Fork Road to an area which appears to the court to be Tl 
R8 Section 4 and possibly into T2 R8 Section 33, north and west 
of the Boyer Reservoir. It also shows the East Fork Road 
terminating in the middle of Section 8 of T2 R8. The roads as 
shown on that map are reflected in X296, Attachment H. The court 
finds that map particularly compelling. 
40. In 1902 William Boyer, according to a public record 
(X123) applied to divert water from what appears to^  be the 
current dam at Boyer Reservoir, then called Boyer Lake, in the 
north east quarter of the north west quarter of Section 34 T2 R8, 
the site of the Boyer property and current Boyer Reservoir. 
41. In 1913 a record from the Summit County Commission shows 
that on November 5, 1913, the commission authorized the 
expenditure of county funds for improvement of the Sage Brush 
Flat road in Chalk Creek. Again, as fcund,y Sage Brush Flats was 
the name of part of the area the court now calls Bench Road. The 
court finds this evidence refers to the B^nch Road area. X244. 
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43. A Summit County map from the county surveyor in 1918, 
without a legend, seems to show a dotted line on, as best the 
court can determine, the rough area of Bench Road and the Middle 
Fork Road, again appearing to terminate at the south end of the 
Jacob property in Section 4 of Tl R8. The East Fork Road appears 
also to be depicted, again terminating in about the middle of 
Section 8 T2 R8. X. 166. 
44. In a Utah Historical Society paper written in 1983 on 
the life of Lady Homesteader Myrtle Rigby it was described how 
she settled in the Chalk Creek area and in the summers frequent 
city visitors arrived, teams and horses prepared, and everyone 
was off to Blue Lake or Bear River to fish. This is again not 
specific as to any particular route or road but it does show use 
of the public of this area on public land. X160 
45. A 1925 U.S. Forest Service map, X167, is claimed by 
Jacob to show the road. The court cannot decipher the map 
provided and cannot find the road referenced. 
46. X168, a U.S. Forest Service map of 1929 appears to show 
a trail, depicted on the legend as lower than a good or poor 
motor road and lower than a "Road Not Passable by Motor" roughly 
in the area of what appears to the court to be the Bench Road and 
the Middle Fork Road. It appears to Show the entire loop, but it 
shows no lakes and does not appear to the court to be the same as 
the other maps showing the East Fork Road. A map from 1931, X169, 
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appears to show the same thing* A 1935 Forest Service map appears 
to show the same thing, X170. In 1942 a similar map shows the 
same loop road but it is on the legend as a "poor" motor vehicle 
road, X171. 
47. In a Summit County Commission meeting of September 1947 
(X 133) a Fish and Game Warden named Ira Page appeared and made a 
statement that Haynes had closed the road to Blue Lake and that 
road had been used by the public for a long time and the matter 
was referred to the County Attorney. 
48. At various times earlier various news articles and 
journal entries showed people were in this vicinity engaged in 
various activities. The court will not identify each date 
involved but in summary they showed as follows. Sheep herders 
from the hills came to dances at Upton, on SR 133 a few miles 
from the entry point to the Bench Road off SR 133, but there is 
no indication as to how those people traveled to get to Upton or 
precisely where they came from, but the court finds there is some 
inference they went on a road rather than through the deep forest 
or over cliffs or across creeks or streams. Sawmills were clearly 
present in the area in 1881. A man was lost in 1890 in the East 
Fork coinage area and a search posse was $ent for him, but there 
is no indication of precisely where nor yhattroutes wese used^ In 
1881 a news paper article showed a per$oh from Upton was killed 
in a wagon accident 13 miles south east of Upton, which would be 
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in this area, after visiting a saw mill in the area. This shows 
persons from Upton visited this East Fork area. X145. 
49, Numerous people testified at trial about their comings 
and goings after these parties acquired their properties in the 
1930s and early 1940s. While the court was aware of the objection 
of Haynes the court allowed the testimony over the relevance 
objection of Haynes, indicating it would hear the evidence and 
determine if it was relevant. It was necessary for the court to 
hear the evidence as a whole before the court could determine if 
it was persuasive. The testimony was all relevant as it tended 
to prove an issue in the case, namely, who had used this road and 
under what conditions. 
50. William L. Christensen is the a grandson of A.E. 
Christensen, the grantee from Wasatch Livestock of what is now 
the Jacob property. He began going to this area and the Jacob 
property in the late 1930s as a young man, having been born in 
1932. He went with his father. After leaving the county road, 
SR 133, Chalk Creek Road, they would take a road and travel it 
until they came to the Jacob property. The court finds that was 
along the Bench Road. He saw no gates, locked or unlocked after 
leaving the highway. He did recall seeing a sawmill on the Jacob 
property about 1940. After his father died in 1945 he did not go 
to the property until the 1960s, after serving in the military 
and after being married and having children. A cabin had been 
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built by the Jacob family, as distinguished from the Christensen 
family, in about 1948 and he went regularly to use that cabin and 
enjoy the property. He began to see gates on the Haynes property 
in the 1960s. There were signs put up by Joe Jacob on the Haynes-
Jacob property line (between Sections 18-19of T2 R8) and he 
recalls -them in the 1960s. He participated in the planning of 
what is called the Christensen cabin in the early 1970s and there 
were no restrictions on travel or construction equipment along 
the Bench Road or Middle Fork Road. He is familiar with Jacob 
having commissioned an oil and gas exploration and the big trucks 
that used the area and the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road for 
that purpose without difficulty. He participated in a meeting in 
1984 when Haynes, through Howard Haynes Jr., began to be upset 
about usage of the road. From that X255 was created, an 
agreement about use of the road, the so-called 1984 Agreement. 
The cabins built by Jacob and later the Christensens are located 
at approximately Point K on X117 in Section 4 Tl R8„ He saw signs 
periodically in various places concerning trespassing and such 
but paid them no mind as he and his family always believed they 
had full access to the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road. On one 
occasion in the 1960s Howard Haynes Sr was stationed by the fence 
then existing off SR 133 and he allowed Christensen to pass after 
Christensen presented a note from Joe Jacob explaining who he, 
William Christensen, was. The 1960s is also the first time he 
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recalls seeing a fence between the Haynes-Jacob properties on 
sections 18-19 T2 R8. He recalls the road being narrow from the 
1930s and early 1940s, with ruts if the weather was bad, and that 
was so until perhaps the 1970s. He felt there was no limitation 
on the use of the road and that it was always a public road. At 
some point there was a gate and locks and Joe Jacob gave 
Christensen either a key or a combination to enter onto the 
Haynes property off SR 133. He assumed it was a public road until 
the 1960s when it became private. He never kept the Boyers off 
the Jacob property. 
51. William E. Christensen, son of William L. Christensen, 
testified the family wants to be free to develop the property as 
the Summit County zoning ordinances will allow, but the 
Christensens do not plan on having a big development but want to 
build other family cabins on their land. He has often hunted, 
fished, and otherwise recreated, at various times, and has taken 
many guests and others have been along, including television 
media trucks to film hunts and fishing activities on the Jacob 
property. No gates were locked before 1984. The road was often 
graded. He has had as many as 400 guests on the Jacob property 
and he nor those guests were never stopped. The Christensen 
family wants a conservation easement and full access may be more 
attractive economically if they are compensated for it. Travel 
was by the East Fork Road and Bench Road to the cabin areas. 
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52. Gary and Greg Boyer, brothers, own an interest in the 
Boyer property, and Gary Boyer has studied the road issue by 
examining historic documents for several hundreds of hours. He is 
the son of Fay and Fern Boyer. The Boyers first bought land in 
the area in 1905 and received patent in about 1913. Gary has 
been going to the area since he was a young man in the late 
1950s, and since then he has been hundreds of times. The Boyers 
usually went on the East Fork Road, and Howard Haynes Sr. had 
left a key under a rock so they could have access. There was 
another gate on the East Fork Road, just east of the split in the 
loop, on Haynes property in Section 7 T2 R8. Until the 1980s the 
main gate off SR 133 was not locked. There was a gate but it was 
open. The East Fork Road gate was first locked in the mid 1970s. 
Gary has never been turned away, and he has taken groups of 
people and none has ever been stopped from using the East Fork 
Road. Gary Boyer felt Haynes was attempting to block entry so he 
began a study of the area. He has believed the Middle Fork Road 
was always public. The Boyers would also like to build a cabin 
on their property. Many, many photographs were received, X269-
293, X307, portions of X51, and others, each consisting of 
multiple photos of various areas and portions of the road and 
signs from the early 1970s until the present. They show many of 
the beauties of the area, as well as portions of the road. As 
noted herein there are several photos from much earlier. 
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53. In the late 1940s the Jacob family built a cabin, in the 
area in Section 4 Tl R8, near the south end of their property, 
west and south of Boyer Lake. They built a second cabin in the 
mid 1950s in the same area. Zoning ordinances then were not what 
they are now and almost no approval was needed and no inspections 
occurred by county officials. The Christensen family completed a 
much larger cabin in the same vicinity in about 1974. Sometime in 
the mid 1990s Garff began to build a cabin, what is called the 
fourth or Garff cabin. Garff evidently married a daughter of Joe 
Jacob, though the court may be incorrect, but in any event Garff 
is now a member of the Jacob family. He obtained building 
permits from Summit County and began building a large, 4500 
square foot retreat/residence on the Jacob property not far from 
the older Jacob cabins. That event was evidently the impetus for 
ths lawsuit which was filed in 1998. That Garff cabin evidently 
remains unfinished and little or no evidence was presented 
respecting this building. The court did observe it from a 
distance on the October 2007 field trip but paid little attention 
to its level of completion and the court is unaware as to the 
status of the interior of the facility. 
53. Charles Herman married i&to the Chr.i3tensen family* He 
first went to the a^cefe property 3$* 19€5, and h^ drove the roads 
in a passenger vehicle. He has been there often and frequently 
uses the property. He was basically in charge of building the 
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Christensen cabin, near point K on X117, in the early 1970s. It 
is approximately 5000 square feet, with 6 bedrooms and many, many 
bunk beds, and it is designed as a family retreat- It was built 
in the Summer months of 1972-1974, by using a crew of 5. It 
involved the normal construction equipment, including a large 
crane, cement trucks, 10 wheel dump trucks, front end loaders and 
heavy excavation equipment. He does not recall ever being asked 
to leave nor did the work crews ever experience any event wherein 
Haynes asked them to leave. Horman has used the property often 
and has often had large numbers of guests for church and youth 
gatherings at this cabin, and none were ever asked to leave the 
Haynes property or were they turned away. All material for the 
Christensen cabin was hauled to the site over the Haynes property 
on the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road and there was never any 
issue raised about usage of that road. Horman is aware of the 
1984 agreement and after that he found the main gate off SR 133 
locked which closed the road leading from SR 133 to Haynes 
property, and he removed the gate by force on two occasions, 
believing the 1984 agreement allowed access. He further 
developed two retaining and fishing ponds on Section 31 of T2 R8, 
and accessed those by what is called the West Fork Road, crossing 
Haynes property with large equipment and a crew and those too had 
free access across Haynes property &long the Bench Road. Those 
have been stocked with fish regularly, at least every other year, 
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and private suppliers have been hired and have come to the Jacob 
property to plant the fish across the Bench Road onto the West 
Fork Road. Jacob, through Joe Jacob, put up signs on the gate 
leading from Haynes Bench Road to the Middle Fork Road on Jacob 
property, indicating private property and no trespassing* There 
is also a gate on the property line between the Boyer property by 
Boyer Lake and the Jacob property, and that is to keep the water 
users from the Jacob property. He never saw a gate locked between 
1965 and 1975 onto the Haynes property. He graded the entire 
road, the entire loop, often during the 1970s. During the 1980s 
and into the early 1990s Alfred Blonquist, working at the time 
for Geary Construction, was hired to grade the road and he did it 
yearly along the entire loop. Blonquist was hired by Jacob and 
by the Hoytsville water users to do that work. 
54. The Jacobs have had a presence on their property also. 
They too went often to the property and were never stopped, never 
asked to leave. They have brought large groups of people also, 
church and youth groups, and have not been blocked from using the 
Bench Road and Middle Fork Road. They have invited various 
others, such as pond inspectors when they built fishing ponds on 
their property. The Jacobs also testify there was never a locked 
gate at entrance off SR 133 before 1984 ^  There was one sign, X51-
32, on Middle Fork Road heading north off Jacob property to the 
Haynes property. It states "limited access road next 5.15 miles. 
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No Hunting, No Trespassing. Haynes Land & Livestock Co." That 
sign has been in place for some time. That sign is seen one 
leaves the Jacob property, off the Middle Fork Road, onto the 
Haynes property, the Bench Road, There was no testimony but the 
court finds, based on its travel to the site with counsel, that 
the distance between SR 133 and the boundary line between 
Sections 18-19 is approximately 5 miles. 
55. The 1984 Agreement, X255, is between Haynes and Jacob. 
It, in summary, indicated Jacob had certain claims, Haynes 
recognized the 1939 deed granting access, and stated Jacob could 
have a right of way as described in the 1939 deed but Jacob 
claimed further rights; Haynes was allowed to keep a gate but 
would provide either 100 keys to Jacob or a combination allowing 
access. Jacob agreed to allow Haynes a perpetual easement and 
right of access for irrigation purposes in sections 20 and 21. 
Both parties reserved any rights they claim. 
56. Robert Powell, not associated with either party, is a 79 
year old man who grew up in the Coalville area on a small farm 
and he often went to the East Fork drainage area. He went to the 
area often with his father in their 1934 truck, and the road was 
not blocked nor was the gate locked. They usually went to what 
are called the Blue L^kes, which consist of what is now Boyer 
Reservoir, Joyce Lake, and Blue Lake, which is east of Boyer 
Reservoir in T2 R8 Section 35. An incident he recalled in the 
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1940s happened where some man, not identified, said the road was 
private and Powell's father said it was not, it was open to all 
and that he had used it for years. In 1965 Powell recalled the 
gate being unlocked but locked in the 1980s. He as never stopped 
in his journeys. He did not describe the route of travel. 
57. Kay Crittendon, not associated with any parties, is an 
85 year old man and life long resident of Coalville. He often 
fished at the Blue Lakes before 1935 and there were no gates or 
fences and no signs, and that was true until 1941. After 1935 
his father did all the road work and helped build the Boyer 
Reservoir. He produced photographs from 1938 showing the East 
Fork Road at section 8 ended there. (X52-1 through 52-4, 
originals returned to Crittendon and copies substituted in the 
court record), His father cut the road east and south from the 
middle of section 8 where the East Fork Road ended and helped 
build what is now the current East Fork Road in 1938-1941. 
Crittendon fished at those lakes after World War II and when more 
people, sometimes called the "city savages," began to frequent 
the area Howard Haynes Sr* began to try to stop the invasion by 
halting people at SR 133, Crittendon saw the dipping corrals in 
Section 19 T2 R8 and observed them just off the road Middle Fork 
Road. 
58. Alfred Blonquist, one of the owners of the Boyer parcel, 
was given a copy of a map before he bought the property. That 
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map, X205, shows the entire loop at issue was declared a Class D 
county road in 1978. That map's origin is unknown but it was 
created and filed with the Utah Department of Transportation in 
1978 pursuant to statute, now UCA 72-3-105. There was no county 
commission resolution or approval and no records appear to be 
extant which shed any light on how that Class D map came into 
being, it just exists and is on file with UDOT. It is also kept 
available for the public with the Summit County Recorder. It 
shows the entire loop is a Class D road since 1978. A Class D 
road is one that involves no maintenance by the county. 
59. The deposition of Gwennola Blonquist, now deceased, was 
received on behalf of Haynes. She was born 1912, lived in the 
Coalville area until 1933, left, and returned in about 1940. As 
a youth she and others went to the Blue Lakes without permission 
and lots of people used the roads and those lakes. They usually 
went via East Fork Road but the deposition did not, to the court, 
clearly identify the precise route. She saw Jimmy's saw mill and 
corrals which were along the Bench and Middle Fork Road, saw no 
signs or fences or gates, and all was open. Her family got lumber 
from the area without permission though that route wa& not notes 
as to how they got wherever they went. Small boats were on the 
lakes and were used by various people, 
60. The deposition of' Lament Staley, born in 1927, was 
received, as he now lives elsewhere* He lived in the area and 
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also went with his father in the mid 1930s to the area. They 
found what they believed was the crumbled cabin of his 
grandfather William by Red Hole Section 18, which is accessed by 
the Bench Road. He went on scout trips in about 1935 to Blue Lake 
without permission. He did not recall any gates and thinks it was 
all open. His route was not well identified. 
61. In March 2006 Haynes has petitioned, as shown in X134, 
the Summit County Board of Commissioners (SCBC) to vacate the 
Class D road which has been on file with UDOT. In an April 2006 
hearing the SCBC deferred action. X135. In September 2006 a 
petition for reconsideration was filed by Haynes, and a hearing 
was held February 14, 2007. X302, 260. The county has deferred 
action until this litigation is resolved. After this court issued 
its ruling denying Jacob's motion for summary judgment in March 
2007 Haynes again wrote the SCBC in April 2007 asking for another 
public hearing in May 2007. X303. That was evidently denied. 
Another letter was sent by Haynes in July 2007 asking for a 
public hearing. Another formal request was filed by Haynes in 
August 2007 on behalf of Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users, 
joined by Haynes and Triple H. X304, 
62. Haynes has placed some of their property in a 
Conservation Easement in 1999. Haynes granted the easement to the 
State of Utah who may monitor compliance and is to preserve the 
Conservation Values of the property. Haynes reserved the right 
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to build structures on Section 18 T2 R8, Section 1 T2 R7, 
including as many as 6 cabins of up to 2500 square feet, along 
with out buildings. A Ranch Headquarters was allowed on Section 1 
T2 R7 or Section 36 T3 R7, each such section being in the 
northern portions of the Haynes property accessed by the Bench 
Road. 
63. There was ample contrary testimony from witnesses called 
by Haynes to contradict the recent use of the road at issue, the 
entire loop. 
64. One of the current partners in Haynes, Howard Haynes, 
Jr. MD, a man of 87, first went with his father to the property 
in about 1934 after the northern portions were purchased in 1932. 
He helped with the sheep and other chores, trailed (or drove) the 
sheep from Tooele to this land for Summer grazing, and did many 
tasks over the years. He testified at that time he believed the 
intervening land (Sections 7, 8, 16, 17, and 18, T2 R8, not owned 
by Haynes until about 1941), were crossed to get to the north 
portion of the Haynes property under the assumption that there 
was some sort of permission from the owners at the time. The 
East Fork Road ended at Section 8. The reservoir company 
furthered the road to get to the reservoir, Boyer Reservoir. His 
father kept the gate locked as much as possible with the intent 
to keep people, the public, out. He now runs the ranch with his 
sister Shirley MacFarlane. The property was heavily guarded in 
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hunting season, basically the Fall of each year, and the gate was 
locked as much as possible. Haynes has built one cabin on the 
property but the evidence did not reveal its location and the 
court does not recall seeing it. The court does recall seeing a 
small cabin off to the west of the Bench Road possibly in Section 
18 or Section 7 T2 R8 and that may be the cabin referenced by the 
testimony.. When problems began to arise in about 1981 he 
entered into the 1984 agreement, X255. Historically he recalls a 
saw mill, called Jimmy's, near the Haynes-Jacob border by 
Sections 18-19, and the Bench Road was well defined when the 
property was first purchased when he first went there. 
65. Haynes partner and sister Shirley MacFarlane, born in 
1935, went often to the property and it was always gated, there 
were signs, and it was guarded in hunting season. 
66. That agreement, X255, basically gives Jacob the right to 
use the Bench Road for the purposes in the deeds 
(agricultural)and a key or combination system was put in place so 
Jacob could use the road. Jacob gave Haynes an irrigation 
easement on Section 20 and 21 to install a head gate. Each party 
reserved any rights and claims it had. 
67. A deposition of Leroy Meadows, age 85, was received and 
considered. He was a local man and visited often in the area. 
He recalled a gate in about 1926, and always got permission from 
Howard Haynes, Sr, to use the land, -or from the Wright Brothers, 
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the previous owners. The East Fork Road was not a road and was 
very primitive. By reputation in the area the road, the entire 
loop, was private and controlled by Haynes. 
68. The Clyde Collard deposition was also received. He was 
a man of age 8 6 when deposed in 2006 and he was familiar with the 
area. He ran sheep on the Jacob property by lease, after World War 
II. He recalled the gate being locked most of the time and Jacob 
also had a locked gate leading to Jacob's property. The East 
Fork Road was hardly ever traveled. 
69. Many others, including Thomas Moore, a part-time fire 
marshal, were in the area since the 1970s and stated the gate off 
SR 133 was locked and Haynes tried to keep people off the road. 
Many others on behalf of Haynes testified concerning the road 
recent years, since the 1960s or so. They have been on the 
property and the main gate off SR 133 was usually locked and 
Haynes attempted to keep people off the road. 
70. In September 1998 the deputy county attorney for Summit 
County wrote counsel for Haynes and stated the county took no 
official position on whether the road at issue, the entire loop, 
was or was not a public thoroughfare by operation of State 
statute. That contrasts with the current Summit County position 
which is that this entire loop road is a Class D county road and 
a public road. 
71. The road across the Boyer Reservoir, a portion of the 
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Boyer Road, is only 12 feet wide. It goes across the top of the 
dam, which is inspected by state Department of Natural Resources 
personnel. It is classified as a high hazard dam should it fail. 
Outlet issues have arisen and the State officials have indicated 
the measuring devices need greater protection. They discourage 
any traffic across the top of the dam. If the road remains those 
dam officials recommend a 20-24 foot wide road at the top, which 
would require substantial cost of approximately $900,000 to 
change the Boyer Reservoir system. 
72. The Water Users initiated litigation in 1939 to condemn 
the land for what is called the Boyer Reservoir, though it was a 
natural reservoir before, as well as seek the roadway on the East 
Fork Road. The jury awarded damages for that taking in 1942. 
73. After all the conflicts in that testimony concerning the 
use bf the properties, the gates and locks and signs, the court 
finds that after Howard Haynes Sr bought the final portion of the 
Haynes property in 1941 the gates were locked most of the time 
and it was the intent of Haynes to keep people off the property. 
Further, after Joe Jacob bought the property from about the same 
time frame in 1938 he locked the gate from Haynes property to the 
Jacob property at Sections 18-19 T2 R8 and it wa3 Jacob's intent 
to keep th^ public off the property. Factually since 1941 the 
Bench Road and the Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road have 
been private roads and hove not become public roads through usage 
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by the public since that time, 
74. The court finds this road at issue is basically a 
"summer" road. There was no direct testimony as to the amount of 
snowfall at any given time but the court does not exist in a 
vacuum and can take judicial notice, even without being requested 
to do so in a civil matter under URE, Rule 201, of facts 
generally known- The court is not taking judicial notice that 
the road at issue is or is not passable at any given time, nor of 
precisely how much snow there'is at any particular time, but 
there is a lot of snow this season and the court believes at this 
elevation this road is not visible or accessible by motor vehicle 
a good part of the year. Further, the court went on the "field 
trip" on October 3, 2007, and had off-the-record discussions with 
counsel. From all of the descriptions of the use of this road, 
it is clear that the "road" is not used when there is substantial 
snow on the ground. Snowmobiles have been alluded to in the 
trial and on the field trip and clearly the snow fall in this 
area prohibits use by motor vehicle when there is substantial 
snow. A snowmobile may ride "over" the road but not along it. 
When the court went on the field trip there were patches of snow 
on the north side of trees and hills and that was October 3, 
2007. The court was advised that the Jacob Cabins are located at 
approximately 9100 feet above sea level and at times they have 
been completely covered by snow. During trial, in a recess off 
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the record, the court indicated somewhat jokingly to counsel it 
would like to go back to the property, being aware there was 
still substantial snow in the area. The court was advised by 
someone there was probably still approximately 10 feet of snow by 
the Jacob cabins. From all this, the court finds that whatever 
use is and has been made of the road, that use by vehicles is 
seasonal and basically non-existent when there is substantial 
snowfall. The lowest of the Haynes property is approximately 
7500 feet above sea level. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The court will discuss the law it is relying not in an 
attempt to educate the parties or anyone else but itself. The 
parties have filed helpful memoranda, but in an effort to 
demonstrate why the court is concluding as it is the court 
recites its understanding of the governing law. 
2. Jacob's first alternative relief is for the court to 
declare this entire loop is a public road under law. As noted in 
the court's previous ruling in March 2007, the relative 
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simplicity of what is called the Dedication Statute, UCA 72-5-
104, belies the difficulty of this case. This case is a very, 
very difficult case for the court and it is not a clear cut case 
at all. The court is attempting to follow the law and do equity 
as the relief sought, declaration of a public road, is an 
equitable remedy. Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P. 2d 
211, 213 (UT 1981), The court is also trying to solve an ongoing 
problem between the parties and is trying not to create 
additional litigation. 
3. The case, by its nature, is very difficult. As has been 
recognized in such "public road cases/' a trial court is given a 
fair degree of discretion in determining the legal consequences 
of the facts as found by the court because the legal requirements 
are highly fact dependent and somewhat amorphous. Heber City Corp 
v. Simpson, 942 P. 2d 301, 311 (UT. 1997). These cases by their 
nature, especially this one because Jacob has asked the court to 
make a determination from a time beginning almost 150 years ago, 
involve "reconstruction of historical facts concerning timing, 
nature, and the extent of public usage. . . [W]itnesses are 
required to dredge the recesses of their minds for aged memories. 
. . . Trial courts should be permitted some rein to grapple with 
the multitude of fact patterns that may constitute . . . " [a 
public road]. Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 912-913 (UT. App. 
1996). Whether the facts show a public road is a question of fact 
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and law which involves complex facts, evidentiary resolutions and 
credibility determinations. The court finds and concludes in this 
case there are very, very few credibility determinations at issue 
of any importance. Almost all the witnesses are found to be 
honest and credible and they saw events as they believed them to 
be from their perspective. Almost none of the court's decisions 
are governed by credibility determinations. 
4. This case is again made very difficult by the history 
involved. As found and discussed herein, the "original" owners 
back in the early 1940s were Howard Haynes Sr and Joe Jacob, 
along with of course the Christensen family and other siblings of 
those two principal operators of the land. Now a few generations 
have passed and the offspring of those men are at odds. The 
problem has been discussed in many cases, such as Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005). While 
that case was in a differing context, the problem is now that 
what was once used as part of the public lands is now in the 
hands of private individuals. The owners whose land is crossed 
(Haynes) do not want their land disturbed, ruined, full of 
strangers and "city savages" who may destroy the beauty and peace 
of the area and interfere with a livestock business. Indeed, 
Shirley MacFarlane indicated that the Jacob property users were 
using the Bench Road as a speed way and she feared for the safety 
of the Haynes families. The Jacobs on the other hand want to 
-48-
001440 
enjoy their property in the same fashion and be free to allow 
their families, now growing larger just as the Haynes families 
are growing, to fully use and enjoy their land and not be stuck 
with only the ability, figuratively, to herd sheep down the road. 
The Jacobs and Christensens have built a few cabins and want to 
build a few more- The Haynes fear the Jacobs will build a 
veritable city and those residents will have to cross the Haynes 
land to get to that "city." The Jacobs believe they have the 
right to enjoy their property as they have done in the past and 
that now means building some additional cabins for their 
increasing family and does not mean having to use only the two 
small cabins (one is about 700 square feet and one 2500 square 
feet) to attempt to house and provide a refuge and retreat for a 
large family. Each party clearly has a very profound sense of 
right and entitlement and the court's determination will affect 
these parties greatly, as well as several generations of their 
families yet to come. 
8. The case is again made more difficult because of the 
nature of the claim of Jacobs, particularly its timing-that this 
entire loop was and is a public road from over 100 years ago, 
beginning perhaps as early as 1865, but certainly in the period 
1881? £or1896. fftat obviously Entails proof of facts mostly from 
documents rather than live witnesses. No witnesses appeared, nor 
could any be expected to, who were alive before 1896. Further, 
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Haynes argued correctly that it could not possibly prove a 
negative from that time frame. Proving a negative is at best 
difficult and from this time frame may well be impossible. As 
noted by the court in the summary judgment determination, it 
would be highly unlikely to find a government record or newspaper 
article from, for example, 1892, indicating that no one used the 
East Fork loop this season. It is, of course, not the burden of 
Haynes to disprove public use but it is the burden of Jacob to 
prove public use and all that those elements entail. 
9. This case is also somewhat unique in that it is from a 
time when the lands at issue were in the public domain. As 
found, prior to statehood in 1896, all of these sections and 
lands at issue, all of them, were in the public domain. The even 
numbered sections belonged to the United States and in 1869 the 
odd numbered sections belonged to the railroads through a grant 
from the United States. From that time (1869) until about 
statehood in 1896, the odd numbered sections belonged to the 
railroads. The only odd numbered sections involved as far as 
public use in this case has been principally Section 7. Most of 
the cases the courts have considered involved a private party 
seeking to have a road that passes over the private property of 
another declared public. This case differs in that most 
important regard. 
10. This case is also complicated for the court in that the 
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parties, respectfully, all seemed to concentrate on the entirety 
of the road, the entire loop, without any emphasis on any 
particular portion of the road. The court believes the evidence 
was such that the parties probably could have and should have 
focused on a more discrete portion of the road- The court does 
not fault the parties for so arguing, but the court does not 
believe that the entire road merits factually or legally the same 
result. 
11. All of this apologetic aside, this is a close and 
difficult case for the court. 
12. The statute, the Dedication Statute, under which Jacob 
seeks a declaration by the court that this entire loop is a 
public road, states: 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use 
of the public when it has been continuously used 
as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
(2) The dedication and abandonment creates a right-
of-way held by the state in accordance with 
Sections 72-3-102, 72-3-104, 72-3-105, and 72-5-103. 
(3) The scope of the right-of-way is that which is 
reasonable and necessary to ensure safe travel 
according to the facts and circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-104 (2000). 
13. As the Utah Supreme Court has noted in Lindsay Land & 
Livestock v. Churnos, 285 P. 646, the federal legislation from 
1866 allowing SR 2477 roads could be viewed as an offer from the 
United States of a free right of way over the public domain. The 
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enactment of Utah statutes, as well as the common law, is the 
Utah answer of how that offer has been accepted. 
14. It is clear that one who claims a public road exists 
must prove the road is public and has been abandoned and 
dedicated to the public by clear and convincing evidence. Heber 
v. Simpson, at 310. Additionally "the burden of establishing 
public use for the required period of time is on those claiming 
it". Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P. 2d 211f 213 (Utah 
1981). These principles guided the court in its denial of summary 
judgment for Jacob wherein the court stated Jacob had an "uphill" 
battle but would have to prove a public ro^d at trial. 
15. Defendants are required to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that this is a public road and they claim it became such 
in the time frame of 1880-1896. That burden of proof requires 
defendants to produce evidence that causes the court to have a 
firm belief this is a public road. The evidence must reach the 
point where there remains no substantial doubt that this is a 
public road. That is the standard the court is using to 
determine if defendant has shown by clear and convincing evidence 
that there has been a public road created in the time frame 
alleged. Whatever definition of "clear and convincing" is used, 
that burden of proof is less than beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
court is entitled, as the finder of fact, to draw reasonable 
inferences from the facts proven and found. It is clear that one 
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witness can establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt and one 
witness can establish a fact by clear and convincing evidence as 
well. Bonner v. Sudbury, 411 P.2d 646 (UT. 1966). 
16. Recently the Utah Supreme Court decided a trilogy of 
cases in February 2008 which discuss the Dedication Statute and 
apply to this case to some extent, though not entirely. Those 
cases are, of course, Utah County v. Butler, 2008 UT 12; Wasatch 
County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10; and Town of Leeds v. Prisbey, 
2008 UT 11. 
17. For purposes of this case only a few of the important 
holdings have an effect. In discussing the elements required for 
a public road to be found the Court made it clear, again, that 
the burden is on the claimant of a public road to prove it by 
clear and convincing evidence. In Okelberry the Court focused on 
what qualifies as a sufficient interruption to restart the 
running of the 10 year period and stated a bright line rule: 
An overt act that is intended by a property owner to 
interrupt the use of a road as a public thoroughfare, 
and is reasonably calculated to do so, constitutes 
an interruption sufficient to restart the running of 
the required ten-yeaj: period under the Dedication 
Statute. 2008 UT 14,15. 
Thus, the burden remains on Jacob to prove the road has been 
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dedicated to the public continuously. Evidence of an 
interruption in that 10 year period simply precludes a finding of 
continuous use. 
18. From this bright-line rule it is clear to the court and 
the court finds and concludes Jacob and Boyer have failed to show 
this road, the entire loop, was a public road since 1941. Haynes 
and all their witnesses absolutely preclude the court from 
finding by clear and convincing evidence that the gate off SR 133 
was not locked at least once for a period of 10 years. There was 
a good deal of conflict in the testimony and the court need not 
and did not find which "side" is correct, but the court has 
absolutely no difficulty in determining that the court is not 
convinced by Jacob that since Haynes owned the Haynes property 
finally in 1941 that the road was continuously used by the 
public. Indeed, Jacob in essence concedes as much. Haynes, 
through Howard Haynes Sr and others clearly locked gates and put 
up signs telling people, in essence, to keep out. Jacob did the 
same on its property line, and locked a gate. Since these parties 
have owned the property, at least since 1941, this has not been 
dedicated as a public road. 
19. Before 1941, of course, is whista the Jacob parties claim 
this road became public under law., There is no genuine dispute 
about any ten year period at that time as there was virtually no 
compelling evidence that there were gates or fences or signs or 
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anything else before that time. There was some evidence produced 
by Haynes that gates were up as early as 1932, and one witness 
through deposition thought a gate was in place in 1928, when 
Haynes bought the east and north portions of his property, but 
the court will not focus on that time period between 1932 and 
1941 in any event. The court will do as asked by Jacob and 
examine and discuss the evidence as to use by the public, 
continuously, before 1932. After that time no public road was 
created by public use under the Dedication Statute. 
20. Turning to whether this road has been used by the public 
before 1932 continuously for an uninterrupted period of ten years 
requires an examination of what the "public" is. This case 
becomes more complex and somewhat unguided by past cases because 
of, again, the time frame and the public nature of the land 
before 1896, before statehood. 
21. The recent Butler case is helpful but not fully 
determinative of an issue in this case. The public must use the 
road and it must be a public thoroughfare before a road can be 
determined to be a public road under the Dedication Statute. 
Butler makes clear that those with a private right to use a road, 
such as adjoining property owners or those with permission or 
some prescriptive right, are not members of the public, "People 
as a whole" are considered the public, and that class includes 
all trespassers, those with no right to be on the road at all. 
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22, If the public used this road, meaning the entire loop, 
it must be for 10 years without interruption as Okelberry makes 
clear. Under Butler, the ten year period need not be specified, 
the period must simply be at least 10 years. Here, based on the 
evidence, the court concludes that people (the court will discuss 
whether those people amount to the "public"* using a "public 
thoroughfare" later) certainly used portions of this road (to be 
discussed later) for at least 10 years, from perhaps 1865 to 
1932, and certainly up to the time of statehood in 1896. The 
court finds that evidence overwhelming in fact, despite its 
previous doubts expressed in the court's denial of the summary 
judgment motion brought by Jacob, The court has now had the 
advantage of hearing much additional evidence, more carefully 
considering the documents and relating them to the property 
actually viewed by the court, and having more full argument. As 
found, many, many people before 1932 used portions of this road. 
There were several sawmills along various portions of the road. 
There were many, many sheep that were "dipped," at corrals in the 
area requiring the presence of many people. Many people hunted, 
fished, and went to the lakes by some route or another. While 
the court has found the use seasonal because of the heavy 
snowfall, the court concludes that the use of portions of the 
road was continuous. The use of the road need not be great and 
comparatively few people can use a road to make it public, but 
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when the need to use a road arises and the road is used, that use 
is continuous. Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d 101, 1008-109 (UT 1958). 
Natural occurrences, such as flood or snow, which inhibit usage 
of the road do not halt continuous use under the law. Butler, at 
13. If the road is used as often as needed or convenient or 
necessary, even though the use is not constant, it is continuous 
use under the law and mere intermissions by naturally occurring 
events, other than an intentional act of interruption, will not 
halt the continuous nature of the use. Here, pre-1932 and 
certainly pre-1896 the evidence is again overwhelming that a 
large number of persons used some portion of the road for many, 
many purposes on a regular and ongoing basis. 
23. Those purposes are sufficient to establish a road by 
whatever name. In Boyer the Court described the use as being use 
by persons hauling coal, crossing the open range, driving cattle 
and sheep, and people hunting or visiting others. The travel was 
by wagon or other vehicles or horse. The court found that 
sufficient to establish a public road. Interestingly, that case 
arose in Chalk Creek in Summit County as well in an area not far 
from this East Fork drainage area. The Court did not comment or 
discuss the public nature of the domain at the time. Trial was 
in 1956 and the trial court found facts dating back 50 years, to 
presumably about 1900, at or shortly after statehood. 
24. In Lindsay Livestock v. Chumps, 285 P. 646 (UT. 1929) 
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the court dealt with a claim under the predecessor dedication 
statute. There the Court dealt with a time period from 1876 and 
involved findings that the land was patented in about 1900. 
There the lands were similar to these, described as unenclosed, 
uninhabited mountain lands, suitable only for grazing. Lindsay 
involved sheep grazing in the summers, sawmills in 187 6, as well 
as a mining camp. Persons used the road at issue in that case to 
get lumber and work at and visit the mining camp, houses were 
built at the camp, and the use was extensive from 187 6, though 
the mining camp lasted only about 5 years. Since 1900 the use was 
basically only sheep herders moving sheep, supplying sheep camps, 
and fishermen and hunters. No public money was expended on the 
road. The road found to be public in that case was found not to 
be the identical road at the time of trial as was the previous 
use but it was located in substantially the same place. The 
Court upheld the finding of a public road, again without much 
comment about the public nature of the land involved. 
25. The Court upheld the finding of a public road in Jeremy 
v. Bertagnole, 116 P.2d 420 (UT 1941). Important to this case is 
the characterization of the early road, from about 1869, as a 
"trail" or roadway. The road was found to have been used for 
trailing herds of cattle, sheep, and horses* The Court did note 
that all patents issued were subject to the easements and rights 
of way of the public to use all such roads as may have been 
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26. Thus, whatever persons used this road, and the court 
calls it a road, they did so continuously for over 10 years 
before statehood while the lands were all in the public domain. 
27. The next issue the court must discuss is just what 
portion of this road was used. The parties, again respectfully, 
focused on the entire loop. The court in its findings has 
basically divided the road into four parts for its discussion: 
The Bench Road across Haynes property, the Middle Fork across the 
Jacob property, the Boyer road across the Boyer property, and the 
East Fork Road across Haynes property going east then south from 
the Bench Road. The court does not believe the evidence merits 
treating the entire road, the entire loop, identically. 
28. Without yet addressing whether the use was public, the 
court has found and concludes that the Bench Road and Middle 
Fork, to a somewhat imprecise ending, as well as a portion of the 
East Fork road to a somewhat imprecise ending, have been used by 
persons continuously for over 10 years. The East Fork beyond the 
middle of Section 8 T2 R8 and the Boyer Road have not been shown 
by clear and convincing evidence to have been used by persons, 
whether t^« pufelic or not, continuously for ten years. 
29. The court has found, as discussed, that the E^st Fork 
road, based on testimony of Howard Haynes Jr, Kay Crittendon, and 
the early map of 1903 (X134) demonstrate beyond doubt that Jacob 
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has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that a particular 
route was used along the East Fork after leaving the middle of 
Section 8. That area was described as terrible passage, a rock 
pile, and other terms showing it was not heavily or as regularly 
used as the Bench and Middle Fork Roads. Jacob has shown that the 
route along the Bench Road and Middle Fork Roads was used by 
persons regularly and continuously. The East Fork road was 
described as ending in the middle of Section 8 and the early maps 
show that, particularly X134 as reflected in Tab H of X296. The 
road was constructed from the middle of Section 8 for the 
reservoir in about 1940, clearly not 10 years before Haynes 
blocked access. Thus, while there is some evidence people went 
to the blue Lakes regularly, and some evidence that they went via 
East Fork Road, the evidence is not compelling that such use was 
continuous as required at least beyond the middle of Section 8. 
Had it been, the East Fork Road beyond the middle of Section 8 
would have shown up on early maps and it does not. 
30. Contrariwise, the demonstrable depiction of the Bench 
Road and Middle Fork Roads, to some point within Section 4 T2 R8, 
shows a road was created and use. It is only logical that these 
two portions were used by someone or there would not be a road 
shown. A passage is created by use, where timber or vegetation is 
removed for ease of access. Continuous use allows the passage way 
(road) to remain and be depicted on a map. Similarly as to the 
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East Fork Road to the middle of Section 8. A visible road in 
1875, 1893, and on all maps thereafter, together with all the 
other evidence of vast usage, shows it was from early times in at 
least 1875 until statehood, used heavily by persons and that is 
what made the road visible to the surveyor and that use is what 
made the road visible on maps. The court's comments in its March 
2007 ruling to the contrary notwithstanding, the court now having 
viewed the area, the court finds and concludes that persons 
traveling to the blue Lake area would certainly, at least by very 
strong inference, use a road rather than cut through heavy 
timber, up and over cliffs and other steep terrain. Persons 
obtaining timber, for example, whether from a mill or on their 
own from the woods somewhere, would use a wagon to haul the 
timber and that wagon would go on this road, rather than through 
the wild and over steep terrain or over fallen timber. While 
hunters may have strayed off the beaten path to find game, they 
sensibly would travel the road to get to an area to hunt rather 
than take off immediately through the wild terrain, even if on 
horseback. That at least is the reasonable inference the court 
draws from viewing this area and considering normal and 
reasonable human conduct. An inference of reasonable conduct by 
persons can amount to clear and convincing evidence in this 
court's view, when that inference is based on facts proven 
sufficiently. The presence of sawmills, corrals, and homesteads 
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along Bench Road and Middle Fork and along the portion of the 
East Fork Road to the middle of Section 8 show many persons were 
regularly using this road as far back as 1875. 
31. The expert report of Liapis shows that the Bench Road 
and Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road to the middle of 
Section 8 are substantially the same now as when first plotted in 
1875, and are certainly the same as the 1903 USGS map, X134. 
32. That leads the court to the most difficult question 
involved, and that is whether those persons using these Bench 
Roads and Middle Fork Roads and East Fork Roads to the middle of 
Section 8 and those people who "created" these roads by usage 
were members of the public and whether it was a public 
thoroughfare. 
33. The difficult issue in this case is framed by the fact 
that when these lands were used by people, the Bench Road and the 
Middle Fork Road and the East Fork Road to the middle of Section 
8, whoever these people were, the lands they crossed were all 
public lands because they were even numbered sections, except a 
small portion of Section 35 T3 R7, Section 1 T2 R7 Section 7 T2 
R8, and a very small portion of T2 R8 Sections 19 and 33. Thus, 
ANYONE who used those sections, for any purpose, appears to the 
court to be a member of the public. Timber could be taken, 
livestock grazed, hunting could occur, and homesteads could be 
established, all without prior public approval or oversight on 
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the public lands. The bulk of the Bench Road and Middle Fork 
Road was on public lands as being in even numbered sections. 
Only a portion of the East Fork Road is in Section 8 and most of 
it is in Section 7. None of these roads crossed private land to 
create a situation where another landowner now seeks to take 
something away from a previous private landowner as is the case 
with most of the previous court cases. The cases where the 
public road was created during the time before statehood do not 
discuss this aspect of the facts in any detail but it seems of 
utmost importance to this court. The law is not developed 
concerning this issue. It seems almost tautological or 
definitional that any use of a road (or tr>al, or passage way) on 
public land is a public road. Who else did it belong to if not 
the public? It was not private and no one is seeking to now make 
something public that was private previously. Jacob in essence 
is claiming what was public should remain public. 
34. As to the odd number railroad sections there is no 
indication in the record that the railroad ever seriously sought 
to use this land, nor that any railroad ever attempted to 
interfere with its use by the public on these odd numbered 
sections. Thus), while technically perhaps private land as 
belonging to the Railroad, the odd numbered sections were really 
public as well. It is certainly clear from the record before the 
court that there is no evidence the railroad ever sought to 
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exercise its rights as a landowner, during the tenure of 
ownership, concerning the odd numbered sections at issue in this 
case. 
35. Haynes argues that use is presumed permissive but the 
court believes that is particularly true when the use is by 
prescription. This use is not by prescription as the use of the 
road was use of a public road before Haynes owned the property 
over which the road passes. 
36. Even discounting that concept, however, the court finds 
and concludes, based on all the evidence, that these Bench Road 
and Middle Fork Road and East Fork Road to the middle of Section 
8 portions were used by the public continuously for over 10 years 
as a public thoroughfare. 
37. The court believes Jacob's reliance on Lee v. Masner, 45 
P. 3d 794 (CO. App. 2001) as to when homesteaders become owners is 
a reasonable interpretation of the law in Utah. The court agrees 
with Haynes that Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, and now Butler 
and other cases make clear that property owners and invitees are 
not members of the public. However, the court does not believe 
that the case relied on by Haynes,v Rio Grande Western Railway Co. 
v, Telluride, 63 P. 995 (UT* 1900)r stands for what Haynes claims 
it stands for*2 While these homesteaders StaLey, Randall, Huff, 
2The court also does not believe a case cited by Haynes in 
its pre-trial memo, Thumwald v. A.E., 2007 UT 38, states at all 
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and Saxton detailed in the findings above had a right to preempt 
others perhaps as against their use of the property, nothing in 
Utah law the court can find indicates these homesteaders are land 
"owners" until at least they apply for homestead rights. Thus, 
the court concludes, those homesteaders were members of the 
public and it follows their guests and invitees were as well. 
Moreover, the court is not basing its conclusion solely on these 
homesteaders. They are merely some members of the public who used 
these portions of the roads as indicated, 
38. The court concludes that many members of the public, 
trespassers or whatever they be called before 1896, (and they 
were trespassers after 1896 and after others owned the property,) 
and all kinds of people used these sections of the Bench and 
Middle Fork and East Bench Roads. Getting lumber, game, and 
recreating over the years seems never to have stopped and was 
continuous for at least 10 years. Again, a "lag" in usage, 
unless the result of an intentional act of interruption, is not a 
basis to conclude the road was not continuously used by the 
public. Thousands and thousands of-sheep came to the area and 
used the Bench Road and some of the Middle Fork Road to get to 
the corrals, and those thousands and thousands of sheep did not 
appear only episodically. Those thousand and thousands of sheep 
what Haynes claims for it, though it is not an issue given the 
court's resolution. There can be no "taking" as the public road 
is found to exist before Haynes owned the property, 
-65-
001457 
did not get to the corrals or to grazing lands by themselves 
under the direction of a sheep dog. The testimony did not show 
such, but again the court may rely on the common sense notion 
that thousands and thousands of sheep require more than one 
person to herd those sheep. Indeed, Howard Haynes Jr described 
how he helped his father and others with trailing their sheep in 
the 1930s from Tooele. From such facts the court is not amiss in 
inferring many sheep herders and others were responsible for many 
sheep getting to this area. Haynes argues these facts as shown 
are not evidence of continuous use. The court has discussed that 
and use is continuous if use is as needed and desired and is not 
interrupted by an intentional act of the owner. Here, the owner 
of the land at the time, 1880-1896, was the public or the 
railroad, and no objection was ever lodged by the railroad. 
There is no evidence the railroad every did any act amounting to 
an act of interruption. The' use was open and the court believes 
the use of the land was use of public lands on all sections. 
39. Further, while neither this factor nor any one factor is 
determinative, Summit County funds were expended on this road on 
the Bench Road, referred to in X244 as Sage Brush Flats. That 
was in 1913, after these sections were in private ownership but 
before Haynes owned the land. That too adds evidence that at 
least this portion of the road w&s public. 
40. In addition as another factor, while again not 
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determinative as noted in Heber City v. Simpson, at 311 n.8r the 
fact is that Summit County in 1978 determined this was a Class D 
county road. The court is fully aware that this map seems to 
have been created almost immaculately as there is no evidence as 
to its etiology. However, the map exists and is kept in the 
County Recorder's Office and is on file with UDOT pursuant to 
statute. 
41. Even if not used as a public road for years as a public 
road since these parties have owned the land, at least since 1941 
and possibly since 1932, the public nature of the road does not 
"disappear" when the land over which the public road crosses 
comes into private hands. The purchaser, Haynes and before 
Haynes other owners, and Jacob and before Jacob others, all took 
the property subject to the public's right to use the roads. 
Sullivan, at 957. 
42. It is the totality of the evidence that convinces the 
court by clear and convincing evidence these portions of the road 
were used by the public continuously for'at least 10 years, from 
at least 1880 to 1896. 
43. The burden of the usage on Haynes is not as great as if 
Haynes had owned the land when this road was made public by 
public use. Haynes frequently argued a taking of land is 
occurring. As noted, this court does believe that this land was 
public and the road over that public land was dedicated to the 
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public for such use before Haynes or Jacob purchased the land. 
These owners took the land subject to the right of the public to 
use the road. Thus, it is not as if Haynes owned landf the 
public then crossed it and used it, and thus Haynes is being 
deprived of something he had but now has lost. Haynes never 
"had" this road, it has been public since long before he 
purchased the land surrounding the public road. 
44. If a road becomes public under the Dedication Statute 
clearly if Haynes or Jacob anyone erects gates and posts signs 
those actions do not extinguish the public nature of the road. 
Sullivan v. Condas, 290 P. 954, 957 (UT. 1930). This court may 
not vacate a public road and the vacation of a public road may 
only be done according to law. An adjoining owner of public land 
may not obstruct the public right, Schettler v. Lynch, 64 P. 955 
(UT 1901). 
45. As to the East Fork Road east of the middle of Section 8 
the court concludes as well that there has been no public access 
at least since 1941. Prior to that time the road went to the 
middle of section 8 T2 R8 as shown on the early maps, the same as 
show the Bench and Middle Fork Roads. From the middle of Section 
8 going east then south the court does not believe that portion 
of the road ever became public because of its much more limited 
use. The court was not and is not convinced by clear and 
convincing evidence that after the usage of the road to the saw 
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mills in the middle of Section 8 and the "bungalows" in that area 
the use was anything other than sporadic and the route was and is 
unknown. While there were some references to going that way to 
the blue Lakes, the use beyond the saw mills by hunters and 
fishermen and others was far more limited and not conclusive by 
clear and convincing evidence that that portion of the East Fork 
Road was ever abandoned and dedicated to the public. Certainly 
until about 1940 when the present iteration of the road was 
constructed by the Water Users the descriptions of the area 
included phrases such as rocky, a wagon trail, a terrible route, 
almost unpassable, and so forth. While such can still be a road, 
the court is not convinced by clear and convincing evidence that 
any particular route was traveled beyond the middle of Section 8. 
To the extent it was traveled, its use was not continuous and was 
at best episodic by far less members of the public than traversed 
the Bench Road or Middle Fork Road or the East Fork Road to the 
middle of Section 8. The more heavy usage to Peter's Park, so 
called, was before the split of the road* The two homesteads 
that were in the area were at the middle of Section 8 and were 
accessed by the East Fork Road as it ended at the middle of 
Section 8. the one §aw mill just east of the.split of the road in 
Section 7 is certainly similar in character as the sai$6 features 
of usage on the Bench and Middle Fork Roads, However/ the court 
finds the evidence of usage simply not as convincing beyond the 
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mapped ending of the East Fork Road at the middle of Section 8. 
46. Thus, the court concludes that the only public road from 
the early days of 1880 to 1896 and beyond until about 1932 was 
what the court is calling the Bench Road, the Middle Fork Road, 
and the East Fprk Road to the middle of Section 8. 
47. As to the remainder of what is now the East Fork Road, 
however, the Jacob-Christensen entities have been given by 
stipulation a prescriptive easement to use that road for 
traditional purposes for which Jacob has used it in the past. 
That is, for recreation and moving livestock as read into the 
record at the beginning of trial. The Jacob-Christensen family 
may continue to use that East Fork Road simply for access as 
agreed by Haynes but it may not be used for other purposes if 
Jacob desires to in fact build additional cabins, for example. 
That has not been the traditional use of that portion of the 
road. The public road may be used for those reasons beyond the 
stipulated prescriptive easement but the East Fork Road east of 
the middle of Section 8 may be used only for pure access for the 
traditional purposes. It will also allow ingress and egress in 
case of some type of emergency. Of course, in an emergency 
easements are not governing in any event. Simply, the East Fork 
Road east of the middle of Section 8 is not now and has not ever 
been a public road Under the Dedication Statute. 
47. The court is aware that does not solve the Boyerfs 
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problem as to the East Fork Road. The court does not believe 
that the Boyer's have established a prescriptive easement over 
the East Fork Road for at least 20 years before ownership by 
Haynes. Before statehood use by Boyers was not shown. After 
ownership of property in about 1905 the travel demonstrated by 
Boyers was for purposes of going to the lakes and nothing more. 
That court concludes that is not sufficient to demonstrate a 
prescriptive easement for the Boyers over the entirety of East 
Fork Road. If they desire to build a cabin, as they testified, 
the route to be used would have to be along the public road of 
the Bench Road and Middle Fork Road. Any access the Boyers have 
to their property has to be over the public road and then by 
permission by Jacob. 
48. That leaves the Boyer Road at issue. The court is not 
attempting to resolve any reservoir disputes, but the court has 
seen no convincing evidence that at any point in time, except 
recently, that the road across the Boyer Reservoir was used by 
anyone. Of all the travel to the blue Lakes for varying purposes 
by the public or by the Boyers or even the Jacobs, the evidence 
is not convincing that the road used went across the Boyer 
Reservoir. The court concludes that the Boyer Road is then not 
the subject of being a public road nor has anyone shown a 
prescriptive easement right to use the Boyer Road. The Boyer 
Road on the Boyer property is for their use and for the use of 
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those they allow to use that road. With the availability of the 
public road along the Bench Road and the Middle Fork road to a 
point to be discussed further below both the Jacob and Boyer 
entities may use that road to the point where the public road 
ends in Section 4. Beyond that, and onto the Boyer property, the 
Boyer's will have to obtain access by permission of Jacob to go 
from that point to the Boyer property where the current iteration 
of the road leaves the Jacob property onto the Boyer property in 
Section 34 T2 R8. 
49. The court concludes, based on the testimony and again 
relying heavily on X134 and X296, that the public used the Bench 
and Middle Fork Roads as shown on X134 to the eastern most point 
on the Jacob property where the road crosses from Tl R8 Section 4 
into T2 R8 Section 33. At that point the public road established 
by the testimony from 1880 and beyond has not been shown to have 
been established. Thus, any use of the road beyond that point by 
anyone will have to be permissive. The travel routes shown on 
X134 and the historic usage described leads the court to find and 
conclude that is the approximate point where the public gained 
access to the lakes. Beyond that lies the Boyer property line in 
Section 34 from the Jacob property and the evidence does not 
convince the court that any particular route was used to gain 
access to the blue lakes area, and certainly there was 
insufficient evidence (if any) that the public went across the 
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Boyer property and across the Boyer Reservoir, 
50. Thus, the court concludes the road as it currently 
exists, what the court is calling the Middle Fork Road, ends as a 
public road where it crosses at the eastern most point from Tl R8 
Section 4 onto T2 R8 Section 33 as now shown on X117. 
Thereafter, through the Jacob property and across the Boyer 
property on what the court is calling the Boyer Road, the road is 
a private road and may be blocked and permission may be given or 
obtained for the use of the road or any existing easement may 
allow access. The Boyer Road is private except as to any 
easement in favor of the Watet Users, who also enjoy a 
prescriptive easement along the East Fork Road to the Boyer 
property and to the Boyer Reservoir. 
51. Thus, to summarize, the court, from the evidence, 
concludes that the East Fork Road is a public road from the point 
in Section 7 T2 R8 where it splits from the Bench Road to the 
middle of Section 8. From that point the East Fork Road is 
private. Jacob enjoys a historic easement along that road from 
the middle of Section 8 only for access as historically used. 
The Boyers do not enjoy a similar prescriptive easement for the 
same purposes. The Water Users fcnjoy a prescriptive easement 
along that toad as well as Jacob ^ ut only as necessary for its 
purposes. Where that East Fork Road joins onto the Boyer 
property at the tri-junction of the Haynes, Jacob and Boyer 
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properties, at the junction of T2 R8 Sections 34 and Section 27, 
the road remains private through the Boyer property in Section 34 
and it remains private until, going southerly, it enters the 
Jacob property at the eastern most portion of the division of 
Sections 33 T2 R8 and Section 4 Tl R8. The Water Users enjoy a 
prescriptive easement on the Boyer Road and any other use by 
others is permissive. The road is then public back to SR 133 from 
the Jacob property going along the Middle Fork and Bench Roads. 
Boyer does not enjoy a prescriptive easement from its property to 
the point the pubic road begins and any access will have to be by 
permission of Jacob. 
In an attempt to again clarify, BASICALLY as shown on X117, 
the court is concluding, with the slight adjustments noted above, 
that as shown on X117, Section A so labeled is public, Section C 
is private, and Section D is private subject to the easements 
described. Section B is public. 
52. One,of the arguments Haynes has made against any portion 
of the road being declared public is that it goes ''nowhere," 
there is no destination, it does not lead to a public place or 
even a particular site. That has indeed caused the court some 
concern throughout this litigation. In fact the court is aware of 
a few cases cited by the parties that deal with & "dead end" as a 
public road. In Renfro v McCowan, 2006 Dist. LEXIS 84439, the 
road found to be public went to a "view" area as described by the 
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court- In Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P. 2d 211, (UT. 
1981), the road seems to go to many, many cabins, but it does not 
lead to some other public area and when a member of the public 
gets to the "end" the same route, with lots of possible branches 
and loops, must be taken to return to 1-80. Thus, the road in 
that case seems to be similar to the public aspects of this road, 
it leads to a "dead end" with some more loops in the Bertagnole 
road up Tolgate Canyon. The court concludes that such a 
"nowhere" road may still be a public road. The public may drive 
this road from SR 133 on either branch, along the East Fork Road 
to the middle of section B, or along the Bench and Middle Fork 
Roads to Section 4, view the surroundings and turn around and 
travel back the same route as they took to SR 133. That is the 
nature of public roads under these Dedication Statutes based on 
older federal law which allowed creation of such roads. The fact 
that the public aspect of this road leads to a "dead end" as far 
as an actual destination does not defeat the public nature of its 
creation. 
53. As to the width and scope of the public road it has been 
noted, in Bertagnole at 213, that the width of a dedicated 
highway is not limited to the beaten path. The width of a public 
road is to be determined as a question of fact. Butler et.al. v. 
The Pinecrest Water Company, 909 P.2d 225 (UT 1995). In the case 
cited for that proposition, Blonquist v. Blonquist, 516 P.2d 343 
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(UT. 1973), the court upheld a finding, without much discussion, 
of a width of 44 feet as being necessary and reasonable under the 
circumstances based upon the uses made of the road. The width 
which is reasonably safe and convenient for which the road was 
put is the width to be declared. In Memmott v. Anderson, 642 750 
(UT. 1982)r the trial court declared a public road a certain 
width and the Supreme Court found it was unable to determine what 
basis was, used to determine the declared width. Bertagnole 
categorized, at 213-214, some past cases involving mountain 
canyons, and discussed findings of 44 feet, 60 and 82.5 feet in 
varying parts, 49.5 feet and 100 feet. The court in Jeremy v. 
Bertagnole, 116 P.2d 420 (UT 1941) discussed a public road 
created similarly to this case. That case made clear the width of 
the road is not to be measured by the width of the beaten track. 
It was necessary for the court to determine, according to what 
was reasonable and necessary, under all the facts and 
circumstances, the proper width and "where the public have 
acquired the right to a public highway by user, they"are [not] 
limited to such width as has actually been used by them." That 
court noted that generally the greater portion of travel on a 
county road is confined to the tracks made by vehicles, but there 
must bee room enough for, travelers to pass each other. The road 
must be kept in such condition that the public will be safe and 
their rights protected. That court was citing Lindsay Land which 
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had indicated that the declared 100 foot width was justified by 
the evidence which showed more than that had probably been used. 
That case also stated, however, that the court must fix a width 
according to what was reasonable and necessary, under all the 
facts and circumstances, "for the uses which were made of the 
road." The court in Jeremy went on to say the court could not 
turn a bridle path abandoned to the public into a boulevard. "On 
the other hand, the implied dedication of a roadway to automobile 
traffic is the dedication of a roadway of sufficient width for 
safe and convenient use thereof by such traffic." 
54. These cases do not clearly answer the question for the 
court for a number of reasons. First, the cases seem to refer, 
on one hand, to what "was" the use. On the other hand, 
especially in Jeremy, the courts discuss what "is" necessary now 
that the road is declared public for the safety of those "now" 
using the road. The Court has pointed out, in Butler v Pinecrest, 
id, that it was not error for the court to fail to determine 
width when that was not the focus of the litigation. Secondly, 
none of the cases refer to any statutes which state public 
policy. 
55. In this case the court in it? own defense must comment 
on how this issue was raised. During the trial there was 
precious little by way of evidence presented concerning the width 
of any portion of this road. The only direct evidence was from 
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Grant MacFarlane, who testified that at the lower, or northern-
most portions of the Bench Road, that the road was perhaps an 
average of 20 feet wide there- There was evidence from Haynes 
that the road was in places only 8 feet wide and vegetation had 
to be cut in the Spring as it had grown over the space of the 
road when Haynes was a young man. The testimony did not reveal 
any specific places where that occurred or how wide the road was 
at any particular place nor how wide on average the road was. 
Jacob, to the court1, s recollection, did not present any evidence 
directly as to the road width at any point along the entire loop. 
There was some evidence that the road across the Boyer Reservoir 
was 12 feet. The court, as noted, traveled the entire loop in 
October 2007 with counsel. The court was unaware the issue of 
width may arise specifically, and in fact it was hardly mentioned 
during trial except in closing argument and in one post-trial 
brief. It was not mentioned in pre-trial briefs. It was first 
mentioned in the trial in Jacob's closing argument, then Haynes 
responded and Haynes responded in its post-trial brief. During 
the field trip the court did not pay particular attention to. the 
width of the road. However, from that field trip alone the court 
would simply iind and conclude that the width of the road seemed 
to vary greatly from the court's observations from oae point to 
the next. It indeed seemed as narrow as 8 feet in places and it 
seemed wider than 20 feet in others. At the very base in the 
-78-
001470 
northern most portions of the Bench Road testimony showed the oil 
and gas companies expanded the road in the 1980s but the exact 
beginning and ending of that widening was not revealed. Thus, 
respectfully, the court is operating under somewhat of a 
disadvantage. No party referred to any statutes whatever. 
55. Most recently, in fact on March 18, 2008, the Utah 
Supreme Court decided Pearson v. Pearson, 2008 UT 24. In her 
dissenting opinion Chief Justice Durham noted that the courts are 
to examine statutory public policy before turning to common law. 
In this instance a statute and the case law seem to conflict to 
this court's thinking, though again no party briefed the specific 
issues. 
56. UCA 72-5-108 seems to provide a stated legislative 
police that the "width" of rights of way for public highways 
shall be set as the highway authority of the State or county may 
determine for highways under their respective jurisdiction. This 
has been declared by Summit County in 1978 a Class D county road 
and it has now been declared, as described herein, a public road 
by this court. It would thus seem under that statute that the 
county, Summit County, determines the width. The "scope" of the 
right of way is that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure 
safe travel according to the facts and circumstances. UCA 72-5-
104. Thus, to this court these statutes indicate, despite the 
cases to the contrary, that the court need not declare a width as 
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the court defers to the county authority to determine width. The 
cases that upheld the trial court's determination of width did 
not refer to UCA 72-5-108 or its predecessors, UCA 27-12-93, 
which have seemingly been in effect since 1963. The court, based 
on that statute, believes that the determination of width is NOT 
for the court but for county authorities. The determination of 
the width appears to be the responsibility of the county if this 
remains a Class D road. 
57. From these thoughts and recitation of the law the court 
is of the belief that it ought not to declare a width. However, 
if the court's reading of the above statute is wrong, the court 
offers these thoughts and conclusions so that the parties need 
not return to court in the event the county either vacates this 
road or does not believe it is the responsibility of the county 
to declare the width of such a road or highway. 
58. The court believes that it is attempting to solve a 
problem, not merely "find" the law though that is its principle 
task. The evidence showed that Jacob had a crane, cement trucks, 
front end loaders, caterpillars, road graders, pipe hauling 
trucks, 10 wheel dump trucks, media broadcast trucks, and other 
large vehicles on the Bench and Middle Fork Roads. Those 
vehicles seemed to have made it to what the court has concluded 
is the end of the public road without altering the road in its 
public portions. Evidently all construction equipment went along 
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the Bench and Middle Fork roads and not on the East Fork Road. 
The historic use by wagon and foot and horse indeed would require 
much less width in a road normally. The court has not in any way 
focused on the "trailing right" easements contained in X7 and X8 
for example, whereby a 100 foot easement along the road was given 
for trailing and moving sheep. The court believes the language 
of the cases does not restrict the court to the historic uses 
only, but the court may and does consider what will now be safe 
for the public who may use that road if in fact it is the court's 
responsibility to declare a width. Again, the cases seem to say 
it is the court's responsibility but to this court the statute 
seems to say otherwise. If the court is responsible to declare a 
width the court believes the evidence and law allow the court to 
declare the road should be 18 feet in width. That is a far cry 
from that requested by Jacob but given that they have built 3 
cabins and at least part of a fourth cabin at the southern end of 
this now-public road, and given that there may well be greater 
vehicle traffic now that the public may visit the area, and given 
the safety concerns involved in vehicles passing each other, it 
seems to the court a modest change will be required but this will 
still allow what the court concludes is reasonable and necessary 
and convenient for what uses are likely to be made of this public 
road. This will allow two vehicles to pass each other. 
59. Again, the court's view is that the common law of Utah 
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allows the court to declare a width, but the statutory law 
reflecting public policy requires the county to declare the 
width. The court defers to the county but if the court is wrong, 
rather than return to court, the above conclusions are the 
court's view on the matter. 
60. Haynes' contention that this "road widening" could 
amount to a taking is rejected. Again, this public road was 
actually created long before Haynes purchased the property and 
Haynes took the property subject to the public's right of usage. 
The court is now merely determining, if it must, what that usage 
is as far as being reasonably necessary and convenient to the 
public today. A width such that two vehicles can pass each other 
is deemed by the court to be reasonable and proper. 
61. As to the width of the East Fork Road, the court 
believes no evidence justifies any conclusion other than that the 
width should remain just as it is presently on the non-public 
portion. The public portion is subject to the above comments. 
That historical use on the private road amounted to less use than 
the public portion, it is used less in the modern time, and is a 
private road with limited prescriptive use by only the Jacob and 
the $Fater User entities. Boyer can, of course, fully access 
their property via the public road and so there is no need nor 
justification for any other determination as to the East Fork 
Road east of the middle of Section 8. That is also true of the 
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Boyer Road. 
62. The court does not believe the litigation initiated by 
Haynes was in bad faith. It is a most difficult case for the 
court and the court sees no bad faith on behalf of any party 
though the court does wonder why the concessions given by Haynes 
were not announced 10 years ago. It appears true Haynes has not 
really attempted to stop the Jacob entities from use of the loop 
road, but Haynes for some reason believes Boyer has no access. 
Haynes is wrong, but not in bad faith for so believing. 
63. Similarly, the court concludes there are no damages for 
any trespass Haynes has caused by interfering with right of 
access. No evidence was presented on any such damages in any 
event. 
Defendant is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP, 
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. THIS MEMORANDUM DECISION IS 
INCORPORATED INTO ANY PREPARED ORDER AND THIS DECISION IS 
CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE COURT'S FINAL ORDER. 
DATED this ^/j day of j'^Q^Cf , 2008, 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN AND FOR SUMMIT 
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JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, 
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JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, 
et al., 
Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, et al., 
Counterclaim 
Defendants. 
TRIPLE H. RANCH, LC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FERN J. BOYER et al., 
Defendants and 
Third Party-
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
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COMPANY, et al., 
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RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 980600244 
[Consolidating Case Nos. 
00600299 and 980600244] 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
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The above matter came before the court on August 26, 2008 
for oral argument on various motions and requests. 
Haynes was present through Ray G. Martineau and Leslie W. 
Slaugh; Jacob was present through Clark Waddoups, Jonathan 0. 
Hafen, and Tobi D. Potestio; Boyer was present through Brent A. 
Bohman; Summit County was present through Jami R. Brackin, and 
the State of Utah was present through Steven G. Schwendiman. 
Discussion was held on the following: Jacob Family Chalk 
Creek, LLC, Catherine B. Christensen, LLC, and Brian Garff's 
(Jacob) Motion for Entry of Proposed Form of the Order and in the 
alternative to Reopen Evidence for Limited Purpose; Haynes Land & 
Livestock Company, Triple H. Ranch, LC, and Chalk Creek-
Hoytsville Water Users Cbrporation's (Haynes) Motion for 
Reconsideration of Road Width; and Fern Boyer, Gerald G. Boyer, 
Gregory J. Boyer, and J»S. Hansen's (Boyer) Motion for 
Reconsideration, or in the Alternative, for Clarification, 
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Jacob filed their motion on May 15, 2008. Haynes filed an 
opposition memorandum on May 21, 2008. Jacob filed a reply 
memorandum on June 9, 2008. Haynes filed their motion for 
reconsideration on May 21, 2008. Jacob filed an opposition 
memorandum on June 9, 2008. A request to submit was filed by 
Jacob on June 17, 2008. Based thereon oral argument was 
scheduled. That was postponed as Boyer filed their motion for 
reconsideration on July 30, 2008. Haynes filed a memorandum in 
opposition and Boyer filed a reply and request to submit for 
decision the same day. The court scheduled argument on all 
motions for August 26, 2008. 
Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under 
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the 
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties. Since 
taking the issues under advisement, the court has further 
considered the law and facts relating to the issues. The court 
has further reviewed the trial proceeding? and relevant exhibits. 
Now being fully advised, the court renders the following Ruling 
and 'Order. 
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BACKGROUND 
The background for this case was set forth in the Court's 
prior memorandum decision of March 21, 2008. 
ARGUMENTS 
Jacob moves for entry of their proposed form of order and 
final judgment and alternatively to reopen evidence for the 
limited purpose of addressing the issue of the road's width- A 
newer version of a proposed order was provided at argument. 
Jacob's proposed order differs from the decision of the court in 
some respects. First, they request the order be modified to show 
they do not have a prescriptive easement on the East Forfc road. 
Second, they requested but withdrew at oral argument that the 
order be modified to state the road is 36 feet wide for "safety 
and maintenance" purposes instead of the court's 18 foot 
determination. 
Jacob, after reviewing the tape of the trial record, 
suggests that Haynes only stipulated that Jacob had a 
prescriptive easement across the Bench road. 
Jacob agrees that Summit County should determine the width 
of the road. 
-4-
Haynes argues in their opposition memorandum that the road 
should not be expanded beyond the 18 foot declaration and that 
the court should not reopen evidence on the issue of road width. 
Haynes claims that testimony set the traveled surface of the road 
at only eight feet. Eighteen feet would be more than twice that 
width. Haynes says the court found the existing road sufficient 
for travel by large trucks and equipment. Further, Haynes denies 
that the Summit County Development Code, upon which Jacob relies, 
is controlling and that the recommendation contained therein 
pertains to subdivisions only. Haynes argues that the "Rights-
of-way Across Federal Lands Act" upon which Jacob relies is not 
applicable because it was not enacted until after this lawsuit 
commenced. 
Haynes cites Western Kane County Special Service District 
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987) 
which upheld the determination that a road should be 10 feet wide 
while noting it was of such width during its public use. Haynes 
argues that there is no evidence that the road in its present 
condition is not safe. 
Haynes contends that to reopen evidence now on the issue of 
road width would cause them prejudice, be unfair, and would 
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unnecessarily delay proceedings. 
In reply Jacob again asserts that Utah Code Ann, § 72-5-108 
supports a statutorily prescribed road width to be determined by 
Summit County, Summit County joins that position. 
Jacob cites Hunsaker v. State, 509 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1973) 
to show the Utah Supreme Court in determining the width of a road 
started with a statutory presumption and then looked to 
potentially rebutting evidence, Jacob asserts, quoting Jeremy v. 
Bertagnole, 116 P.2d 420, 424 (Utah 1941), that any established 
use should be continually possible in a safe and convenient 
manner. 
Haynes objects to certain portions of the proposed order 
submitted by Jacob. Haynes points to Rule 7(f)(3), URCP, to 
support its assertion that the order should not include a 
reference to incorporating the court's memorandum decision. 
Haynes agrees with Jacob that the order should reflect that 
Jacob has a right to use the Berich road, but not the East Fork 
road. 
Haynes contends the boundary between the Haynes and Boyer 
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properties is at the boundary of sections 27 and 34, not "in" 
section 34 itself. 
Haynes objects to making the road 36 feet wide and insists 
it should remain at 18 feet as originally determined by the 
court. Haynes argues Summit County should not determine the width 
of the road but the court must do so. 
Haynes assert the Boyer Defendants' easement denial was a 
denial of all types of easement, not just prescriptive. 
Haynes asserts the order should state that all other claims 
of access by Jacob are denied. 
Finally, Haynes asserts that the order should say the Jacob 
claim for easement is denied instead of not reached. 
Jacob objects to the proposed order of Haynes. 
Jacob asserts there is a significant difference in denying 
its claim and not reaching it and the language of the order 
should be the claim was not reached. This would enable an 
appellate court to remand with Jacob retaining access to its 
property. If the claim was denied and the appellate court 
reversed the decision that the road is public, Jacob is denied 
access to its property. 
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Boyer argues that the Court has decided without elaboration 
that they do not have a prescriptive right to use the East Fork 
road to access their property and that Water Users have a 
prescriptive easement across their property. Boyer argues the 
court misapprehended their argument as to when the prescriptive 
easement was acquired. Haynes did not even know Boyer had an 
interest in the Boyer property until long after the twenty-year 
period was over. Evidence that a key was given to the gate does 
not mean the use was permissive. 
Boyer recites from the courts memorandum decision that Gary 
and Greg Boyer have used the road for more than the 20-year 
prescriptive easement period. They assert their use was not 
permissive and there was never any interruption of the use. 
Boyer argues the Water Users never asserted a claim for a 
prescriptive right of way across the Boyer property and never 
presented any evidence to that effect. Boyer therefore claim 
there is no leg^l basis for granting such a right of way. 
In opposition Haynes asserts no road existed during the time 
Boyer claims prescriptive use. Haynes maintains that the key 
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given by Howard Haynes, Sr. granted permission to use the road 
and thus the use could not be adverse. By locking the gate, 
Haynes interrupted the statutory period for a prescriptive 
easement. 
Haynes also asserts that the Water Users claims were tried 
by consent. Since there was no objection to the evidence on the 
matter, it would be a waste of resources to try the issue again 
separately. 
Boyer in reply again maintains its use of the road was 
adverse, that provision of a key to the gate does not rebut the 
presumption of adversity, that the Okelberry case does not apply, 
that their use of the road was not under the claim of Jacob-
Christensen, and that Water Users have not presented any evidence 
to support a prescriptive easement. 
DISCUSSION 
The court has fully considered the positions of the parties 
and again reviewed the relevant portions of the file and exhibits 
and reviewed the necessary parts of the file. 
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1. Road width 
The court believes its memorandum decision was correct. 
Under UCA 72-5-108 the relevant highway authority considers the 
factors set forth by statute in that chapter 5 of Title 72. The 
court's comments as to its "feelings" were in essence dicta and 
thoughts as the court ruled and reaffirms that the decision as to 
the width of a public road belongs to Summit County. This court 
is not "delegating" the decision to a governmental entity as the 
legislature has done that. The court believes not only does the 
statute make that clear but policy does as well. Summit County 
is certainly able to conduct hearings and consider input and 
exercise its expertise in a more meaningful manner than is the 
court on such issues as what is reasonable and necessary for 
safety of the public. 
Haynes arguments as to the "taking" are again rejected. The 
court determined previously and reaffirms that Haynes never had 
something to take. This road was public before Haynes bought the 
property and Haynes accepted and took the property subject to 
that public rights Further, there has been no taking at this 
point in any event. 
The court DENIES Haynes motion for reconsideration. Thus, 
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the court will sign an order in the language of paragraph 12 of 
the order provided to the court August 26, 2008, 
2. Boyer's motion to reconsider or clarify. 
The court will not change or modify its final conclusion 
about Boyer's not having any type of easement along the East Fork 
road. The court does not believe any further findings are 
necessary as the court found any use was permissive. The only 
reasonable explanation for having a locked gate and advising 
someone of where a key can be found to open that gate is that the 
use was permissive* Thus, the court will clarify to the extent 
needed that the court found and concludes that any use by the 
Boyers since ownership by Haynes has been permissive and thus 
there can be no prescriptive easement. 
The court does not determine that the bright-line principles 
of Okelberry govern in this situation but the court does conclude 
the reasoning of that case applies as well to a prescriptive 
eaaement situation. Where a gate is erected, "Whether over a 
public road or otherwise, that is a clear interruption of the 
allowed use, whether it be a public road or use under a 
prescriptive easement. Haynes intent is clear here since 
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ownership and the gate along the East Fork was intended to keep 
people out. Again, use by the Boyers was permissive and thus the 
court's conclusion that they have no right of prescriptive 
easement use remains the court's ruling. 
The court believes its conclusion as to the easement of the 
Water Users is also justified by the court's findings as well and 
no modification of that ruling or clarification is granted. 
Boyer's motion to reconsider is DENIED. 
The court has carefully examined the proposed order given 
to the court August 26, 2008, and has considered the comments and 
arguments of the parties as to that order. The court directs 
Jacob-Christensen to prepare a final order in that same form and 
content but adding paragraph 21 from Haynes's proposed order 
dealing with the private nature of the Water User's road. 
The court will then sign that final order which is again to 
incorporate fully the court March 21, 2008, memorandum decision 
as well as this bri^f clarification to the cpurt's denial of 
Boyer's claim of prescriptive easement over the East Fork Road. 
The court believes its memorandum decision of March 21, 
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2008, was correct and reaffirms it in all aspects other than as 
indicated in the order the court will sign. 
DATED t h i s J day of /fl/<f 2008 f 
BY THE .COURT:  
AC-' 
A-
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Attorneys for Jacob Family Chalk Creek, 
LLC; Catherine B. Christensen, L.L.C.; 
and Brian Garff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, • 
et al., : 
Defendants. : 
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, : 
et al., > 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs, > 
vs. ; 
) ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
1
 Civil No. 980600244 
| [Consolidating Case Nos. 00600299 
( and 980600244] 
] Judge: Bruce C. Lubeck 
(j01bB3 
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, et al., 
Counterclaim Defendants. 
TRIPLE H. RANCH, LC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FERN J. BOYER et al., 
Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, et al. 
Third-Party Defendants. 
The above-captioned matter came on for trial before the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck on 
March 4,5,6,7, and 11,2008. The Court took the matter under advisement at the conclusion of the 
trial and on March 21,2008 issued a Memorandum Decision in which the Court set forth its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On 
August 26, 2008, the Court heard oral argument on various motions and requests pertaining to the 
Memorandum Decision. After taking the additional matters under advisement, the Court issued a 
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Ruling and Order on August 29, 2008. For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision, the 
Ruling and Order, and for good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Memorandum Decision of the Court, dated March 21,2008, and the Ruling and 
Order of the Court, dated August 29, 2008, are incorporated into this Order and are considered as 
part of the Court's Final Order. 
2. Jacob Family Chalk Creek, LLC, Catherine B. Christensen, LLC, and Brian Garff s 
(collectively, "Jacob-Christensen") declaratory action seeking judgment that the road at issue in this 
dispute (the uRoad") is a public right of way is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: 
A. Pursuant to "R.S. 2477," Act of July 26,1866,ch.262,§ 8,14 Stat 251,253, 
codified at A3 U.S.C. § 932, repealed by Federal Land Policy Management 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579 § 706(a), 90 Stat. 2743, the Road is a public 
way as it traverses through every even numbered section specified in 
Paragraphs 3 through 5 below. 
B. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2007), the Road is a public way as 
it traverses through every odd numbered section specified in Paragraphs 3 
through 5 below. 
C. The Road is a private way as it traverses through the sections or portions of 
sections specified in Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 below. 
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3. From where the Road forks off of State Road 133 approximately eighteen miles east 
of Coalville, Summit County, Utah and travels in a southeasterly direction along the East Fork of 
Chalk Creek through Sections 35 and 36 of Township 3 North, Range 7 East; Section 1 of 
Township 2 North, Range 7 East; and Sections 6, 7, and 18 of Township 2 North, Range 8 East the 
Road is a public way ("Bench Road"). 
4. From where the Bench Road ends and the Road travels through Sections 19, 20,29, 
32, and 33 of Township 2 North, Range 8 East; and Section 4 of Township 1 North, Range 8 East 
the Road is a public way until the eastern most point where the Road crosses back from Township 1 
North, Range 8 East, Section 4 into Township 2, Range 8 East, Section 33. 
5. From where the Road forks off of the Bench Road in Section 7 of Township 2 North, 
Range 8 East and travels in an easterly direction through Sections 7 and 8 of Township 2 North, 
Range 8 East, the Road is a public way through the west half of Section 8 in the township until it 
reaches the center line. 
6. The portion of the Road beginning at the center line of Section 8, Township 2 North, 
Range 8 East and traveling through the east half of Section 8 and Sections 9,15,16,22,23,26, and 
27 (to the boundary between Sections 27 and 34) of Township 2 North, Range 8 East is not a public 
road. 
7. The portion of the Road described in Paragraphs 5 and 6 above is collectively referred 
to as the "East Fork Road." The East Fork Road ends in Section 34, Township 2 North, Range 8 
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East where the property of Fern Boyer, Gerald Boyer, Gregory Boyer, Alfred Blonquist as Trustee 
(collectively "Boyer Defendants"), and Triple H Ranch LC begins at its north boundary line. 
8. The portion of Road that traverses the property of the Boyer Defendants and Triple H 
Ranch LC in Section 34 of Township 2 North, Range 8 East is a private way and shall be referred 
to herein as the "Boyer Road." 
9. The portion of the Road beginning at the eastern most point where it crosses between 
Township 1 North, Range 8 East, Section 4 and Township 2 North, Range 8 East, Section 33 until 
it reaches the Boyer Road is a private way. 
10. The portion of the Road described in Paragraphs 4 and 9 above is collectively referred 
to as the "Middle Fork Road." 
11. The course of the Road stated in Paragraphs 3 through 10 above is depicted on the 
map introduced as trial Exhibit 117, which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein 
by this reference. 
12. The width of the portions of the Road that have been declared a public way shall be 
determined by Summit County, Utah according to that which is reasonable and necessary to ensure 
safe travel based on the facts and circumstances. 
13. The Chalk-Creek Hoytsville Water Users Corporation have a prescriptive easement 
for ingress and egress over the Boyer Road only for purposes of operating and maintaining Joyce 
Lake and Boyer Lake reservoirs. 
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14. The Boyer Defendants' claim for an easement over the East Fork Road is DENIED. 
15. Haynes Land & Livestock Company's ("Haynes") claim that a taking has occurred 
is DENIED. 
16. Haynes' claims to quiet title in the Road as against the Jacob-Christensens 
individually and collectively are DENIED for the portions of the Bench, East Fork, and Middle Fork 
Roads that are public as described above. 
17. Haynes' claims to quiet title in the Road as against the Jacob-Christensens 
individually and collectively are GRANTED for the portion of the East Fork Road that is not a public 
way, as described above, based on a stipulation between Haynes and Jacob-Christensen after the 
Memorandum Decision issued whereby the parties agreed Jacob-Christensen does not have a 
prescriptive easement across the private portion of the East Fork Road. 
18. Jacob-Christensen's claim for damages due to trespass by Haynes is DENIED. 
19. Jacob-Christensen's claim for easement by grant, easement by necessity, and 
prescriptive easement on the Bench Road are not reached based on the Court's ruling that the Bench 
Road is a public way. 
20. Default judgment is hereby entered against B.A. Bingham & Sons, LLC, a limited 
liability company; David B. Williams, an individual; Stillman Seven, a partnership; Karel J. Snyder, 
an individual, Helen W. Blonquist, an individual, Barbara Hall, an individual, and Kevin Hall, an 
individual. 
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21. That portion of the road over the property of Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users 
Corporation in Section 34, Township 2 North, Range 8 East is a private road and no party has 
established any easement or other right of access for the use of that road. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, there being no just reason for delay, pursuant to 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this judgment is entered as a final judgment and 
immediate execution may be had and issued on this final judgment. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT ENTERED this /_S_ day o f September, 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Bruce C. Lubedk,, 
Utah District Court Judge 
''V' / 
bt)lb99 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
day of September, 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT to be served via first class, U.S. Mail, 
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Brent A. Bohman, Esq. 
157 North Commercial Street, Suite 3 
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David L. Thomas, Esq. 
Jami R. Brackin, Esq. 
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2404 Washington Boulevard 
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